内容

目次

Introduction - famous gamesters, Ken Binmore et al; cognition andframing in sequential bargaining for gains and losses, Colin F. Camerer etal; explaining the vote - constituency constraints on sophisticated voting,David Austen-Smith; the dynamics of learning in N-person games with the wrongN, Vincent Brousseau and Alan Kirman; stationary equilibria for deterministicgraphical games, Steve Alpern; stable coalition structures in consecutivegames, Joseph Greenberg and Shlomo Weber; the general nucleolus and thereduced-game property, Michael Maschler et al; some thoughts on efficiencyand information, Francoise Forges; on the fair and coalition-strategyproofallocation of private goods, Herve Moulin; from repeated to differentialgames - how time and uncertainty pervade the theory of games, Alain Haurie;unravelling in games of sharing and exchange, Steven J. Brams et al; doesevolution eliminate dominated strategies?, Larry Samuelson; equilibriumselection in stag hunt games, Hans Carlsson and Eric van Damme; variableuniverse games, Michael Bacharach; aspects of rationalizable behaviour, PeterJ. Hammond; normative validity and meaning of von Neumann-Morgensternutilities, John C. Harsanyi; De-Bayesing games theory, Ken Binmore.