内容

目次

Part 1 Introduction: the great families of models; the principal-agentmodel; overview of the book; references. Part 2 Adverse selection - generaltheory: mechanism design; a discrete model of price discrimination; thestandard model; exercises; references. Part 3 Adverse selection - examplesand extensions: examples of applications; extensions; exercises andreferences. Part 4 Signalling models: the market for second-hand cars; costlysignals; costless signals; other examples; the informed principal; exercises;references. Part 5 Moral hazard: a simple example; extensions examples andapplications; wage determination; exercises; references. Part 6 The dynamicsof complete contracts: commitment and renegotiation; strategic commitment;what are complete contracts? adverse selection; moral hazard; references.Part 7 Incomplete contracts: observable but nonverifiable effort; propertyand residual control rights; contract incompleteness and underinvestment;conclusion remarks; references. Part 8 Some empirical work: adverse selectionmodels; moral hazard models; conclusion; references. Appendices - somenoncooperative game theory: games of perfect information; games of incompleteinformation.