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RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY Contents Volume 1 Kenneth J. Arrow, 'Rationalchoice functions and orderings', Economica, 1959, 26, pp.121-127. Amartya K.Sen, 'Choice functions and revealed preference', Review of Economic Studies,1971, 38, pp.307-317. Jody S. Kraus and Jules L. Coleman, 'Morality and thetheory of rational choice', Ethics, 1987, 97, pp.715-749. W. S. Cooper, 'Howevolutionary biology challenges the classical theory of rational choice',Biology and Philosophy, 1989, 4, pp.457-481. P. Mongin, 'Rational choicetheory considered as psychology and moral philosophy', Philosophy of theSocial Sciences, 1991, 21, pp.5-37. R. Sugden, 'Rational choice: a survey ofcontributions from economics and philosophy', Economic Journal, 1991, 101,pp.751-785. T. J. Barnes and E. Sheppard, 'Is there a place for the rationalactor? A geographical critique of the rational choice paradigm', EconomicGeography, 1992, 68, pp.1-21. Amartya K. Sen, 'Internal consistency ofchoice', Econometrica, 1993, 61, pp.495-521. D. Satz and J. Ferejohn,'Rational choice and social theory', Journal of Philosophy, 1994, 91,pp.71-87. Amartya K. Sen, 'The formulation of rational choice', AmericanEconomic Review, 1994, 84, pp.385-390. D. Houghton, 'Reasonable doubts aboutrational choice', Philosophy, 1995, 70, pp.53-67. Amartya K. Sen,'Maximization and the act of choice', Econometrica, 1997, 65, pp.745-779. M.Rabin, 'Psychology and economics', Journal of Economic Literature, 1998, 36,pp.11-46. R. O. Keohane, 'Rational choice theory and international law:insights and limitations', Journal of Legal Studies, 2002, 31, pp.307-319.Volume 2 F. J. Anscombe and R. J. Aumann, 'A definition of subjectiveprobability', Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 1963, 34, pp.199-205. L. J.Savage, 'Elicitation of personal probabilities and expectations', Journal ofthe American Statistical Association, 1971, 66, pp.783-801. D. Kahneman andA. Tversky, 'Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk',Econometrica, 1979, 47, pp.263-292. D. E. Bell, 'Regret in decision makingunder uncertainty', Operations Research, 1982, 30, pp.961-981. P. J. H.Schoemaker, 'The expected utility model: its variants, purposes, evidence andlimitations', Journal of Economic Literature, 1982, 20, pp.529-563. R.Sugden, 'New developments in the theory of choice under uncertainty',Bulletin of Economic Research, 1986, 38, pp.1-24. A. Tversky and D.Kahneman, 'Rational choice and the framing of decisions', Journal ofBusiness, 1986, 59, pp.251-278. M. J. Machina, 'Choice under uncertainty:problems solved and unsolved', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1987, 1,pp.121-154. M. J. Machina, 'Dynamic consistency and non-expected utilitymodels of choice under uncertainty', Journal of Economic Literature, 1989,27, pp.1622-1668. R. Sarin and P. Wakker, 'A single-stage approach toAnscombe and Aumann's expected utility', Review of Economic Studies, 1997,64, pp.399-409. C. Starmer, 'Developments in non-expected utility theory:the hunt for a descriptive theory of choice under risk', Journal of EconomicLiterature, 2000, 38, pp.332-382. Volume 3 J. C. Harsanyi, 'A generaltheory of rational behavior in game situations', Econometrica, 1966, 34,pp.613-634. R. J. Aumann, 'Agreeing to disagree', Annals of Statistics,1976, 4, pp.1236-1239. J. Heal, 'Common knowledge', Philosophical Quarterly,1978, 28, pp.116-131. A. Schotter and G. Schwodiauer, 'Economics and thetheory of games: a survey', Journal of Economic Literature, 1980, 18,pp.479-527. B. D. Bernheim, 'Rationalizable strategic behavior',Econometrica, 1984, 52, pp.1007-1028. D. G. Pearce, 'Rationalizablestrategic behavior and the problem of perfection', Econometrica, 1984, 52,pp.1029-1050. K. Binmore, 'Modeling rational players: Part 1', Economics andPhilosophy, 1987, 3, pp.179-214. K. Binmore, 'Modeling rational players:Part 2', Economics and Philosophy, 1988, 4, pp.9-55. P. Pettit and R.Sugden, 'The backward induction paradox', Journal of Philosophy, 1989, 86,pp.169-182. A. Rubinstein, 'Comments on the interpretation of game theory',Econometrica, 1991, 59, pp.909-924. A. Brandenburger, 'Knowledge andequilibrium in games', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1992, 6, pp.83-101.J. Geanakoplos, 'Common knowledge', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1992,6, pp.53-82. P. J. Reny, 'Rationality in extensive-form games', Journal ofEconomic Perspectives, 1992, 6, pp.103-118. R. Aumann and A. Brandenburger,'Epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium', Econometrica, 1995, 63,pp.1161-1180. J. C. Harsanyi, 'Games with incomplete information', AmericanEconomic Review, 1995, 85, pp.291-303. Volume 4 G. Tullock, 'The generalirrelevance of the general impossibility theorem', Quarterly Journal ofEconomics, 1967, 81, pp.256-270. A. Sen, 'The impossibility of a Paretianliberal', Journal of Political Economy, 1970, 78, pp.152-157. J. H. Blau, 'Adirect proof of Arrow's theorem', Econometrica, 1972, 40, pp.61-67. A.Gibbard, 'Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result', Econometrica,1973, 41, pp.587-601. J. S. Kelly, 'The impossibility of a just liberal',Economica, 1976, 43, pp.67-75. C. R. Plott, 'Axiomatic social choice theory:an overview and interpretation', American Journal of Political Science, 1976,20, pp.511-596. A. Sen, 'Liberty, unanimity and rights', Economica, 1976,43, pp.217-245. K. J. Arrow, 'Current developments in the theory of socialchoice', Social Research, 1977, 44, pp.607-622. A. Sen, 'Social choicetheory: a re-examination', Econometrica, 1977, 45, pp.53-89. A. Sen,'Liberty and social choice', Journal of Philosophy, 1983, 80, pp.5-28. C.Blackorby, D. Donaldson and J. A. Weymark, 'Social choice with interpersonalutility comparisons: a diagrammatic introduction', International EconomicReview, 1984, 25, pp.327-356. A. Sen, 'Rationality and social choice',American Economic Review, 1995, 85, pp.1-24. A. Sen, 'The possibility ofsocial choice', American Economic Review, 1999, 89, pp.349-378. E. Cantillonand A. Rangel, 'A graphical analysis of some basic results in social choice',Social Choice and Welfare, 2002, 19, pp.587-611. Volume 5 H. A. Simon, 'Abehavioral model of rational choice', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1955,69, pp.99-118. W. J. Baumol and R. E. Quandt, 'Rules of thumb and optimallyimperfect decisions', American Economic Review, 1964, 54, pp.23-46. J. G.March, 'Bounded rationality, ambiguity, and the engineering of choice', BellJournal of Economics, 1978, 9, pp.587-608. H. A. Simon, 'Rationality asprocess and as product of thought', American Economic Review, 1978, 68,pp.1-16. H. Margolis, 'A new model of rational choice', Ethics, 1981, 91,pp.265-279. R. Selten, 'Bounded rationality', Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics, 1990, 146, pp.649-658. S. Honkapohja, 'Adaptivelearning and bounded rationality: an introduction to basic concepts',European Economic Review, 1993, 37, pp.587-594. W. B. Arthur, 'Inductivereasoning and bounded rationality', American Economic Review, 1994, 84,pp.406-411. B. L. Lipman, 'Information processing and bounded rationality: asurvey', Canadian Journal of Economics, 1995, 28, pp.42-67. J. Conlisk, 'Whybounded rationality?', Journal of Economic Literature, 1996, 34, pp.669-700.L. Samuelson, 'Bounded rationality and game theory', Quarterly Review ofEconomics and Finance, 1996, 36, pp.17-35. R. J. Aumann, 'Rationality andbounded rationality', Games and Economic Behavior, 1997, 21, pp.2-14. H.Matsushima, 'Bounded rationality in economics: a game theorist's view',Japanese Economic Review, 1997, 48, pp.293-306. R. H. Thaler, 'From homoeconomicus to homo sapiens', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2000, 14,pp.133-141. D. Dequech, 'Bounded rationality, institutions, anduncertainty', Journal of Economic Issues, 2001, 35, pp.911-929. D. Kahneman,'Maps of bounded rationality: psychology for behavioral economics', AmericanEconomic Review, 2003, 93, pp.1449-1475. B. L. Lipman, 'How to decide how todecide how to ... Modeling limited rationality', Econometrica, 1991, 59,pp.1105-1125.