内容

目次

Part I. Theoretical Framework: 1. Introduction and examples; 2. Therepresentation of a game in extensive form; 3. The representation of a gamein strategic form; 4. The mixed extension of a game; 5. Mixed and behavioralstrategies; 6. Representation in coalition form; Summary; Exercises; Part II.Strategic-Form Analysis: Theory: 7. Dominance and iterative dominance; 8.Nash equilibrium; 9. Zero-sum bilateral games; 10. Nash equilibrium: formalexistence results; 11. Strong and coalition-proof equilibrium; 12. Correlatedequilibrium; 13. Rationalizability; Summary; Exercises; Part III.Strategic-Form Analysis: Applications: 14. Oligopoly (I): static models; 15.Mechanism design (I): efficient allocation of public goods; 16. Mechanismdesign (II): Nash implementation; 17. Markets (I): macroeconomic coordinationfailures; Summary; Exercises; Part IV. Refinements of Nash Equilibrium:Theory: 18. Introduction; 19. Refinements excluding 'incredible threats':examples; 20. Subgame-perfect equilibrium; 21. Weak-perfect Bayesianequilibrium; 22. Refinements excluding 'untenable beliefs': examples; 23.Sequential equilibrium; 24. Perfect and proper equilibria; 25. Strategic-formrefinements; Summary; Exercises; Part V. Refinements of Nash Equilibrium:Applications: 26. Oligopoly (II): sequential moves; 27. Markets (II):decentralized price formation; 28. Oligopoly (III): differentiated products;29. Mechanism design (III): efficient allocation of an indivisible object;Summary, Exercises; Part VI. Incomplete Information: Theory: 30. Introductionand examples; 31. Bayesian games; 32. Bayes-Nash equilibrium; 33. Signallinggames; 34. Mixed strategies revisited: a purification approach; 35. Forwardinduction; Summary; Exercises; Part VII. Incomplete Information:Applications: 36. Markets (III): signalling in the labor market; 37. Markets(IV): insurance markets and adverse selection; 38. Mechanism design (IV):one-sided auctions; 39. Mechanism design (V): buyer-seller trade; Summary;Exercises; Part VIII. Repeated Interaction: Theory: 40. Introduction andexamples; 41. Repeated games: basic theoretical framework; 42. Folk theorems:Nash equilibrium; 43. Reputation and 'irrationality': informal discussion;44. Folk theorems: subgame=perfect equilibrium; 45. Reputation and'irrationality': formal analysis; Summary; Exercises; Part IX. RepeatedInteraction: Applications: 46. Oligopoly (IV): intertemporal collusion in aCournot scenario; 47. Oligopoly (V): intertemporal collusion in a Bertrandscenario; 48. Markets (V): efficiency, wages and unemployment; Summary;Exercises; Part X. Evolutionary Foundations of Equilibrium: 49. Introduction;50. Static analysis; 51. Basic dynamic analysis; 52. Evolution in socialenvironments; 53. The evolution of cooperation: an example; Summary;Exercises; Part XI. Learning to Play: 54. Introduction; 55. Reinforcementlearning; 56. Static perceptions and Nash equilibrium; 57. Memory,expectations and foresight; Summary; Exercises; Part XII. Social Learning andEquilibrium Selection: 58. Introduction; 59. Evolutionary games: theoreticalframework; 60. Evolutionary games: alternative scenarios; 61. Stochasticstability and equilibrium selection; 62. Experimental evidence; 63. PerturbedMarkov processes: basic concepts and techniques; 64. Reinforcement learningwith flexible aspirations; Summary; Exercises.