内容

目次

Introduction: heuristics and biases then and now; Part I. Theoreticaland Empirical Extensions: 1. Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: theconjunction fallacy in probability judgment; 2. Representativeness revisited:attribute substitution in intuitive judgment; 3. How alike is it versus howlikely it is: a disjunction fallacy in probability judgments; 4. Imaginingcan heighten or lower the perceived likelihood of contracting a disease: themediating effect of ease of imagery; 5. The availability heuristic revisited:ease of recall and content of recall as distinct sources of information; 6.Incorporating the irrelevant: anchors in judgments of belief and value; 7.Putting adjustment back in the anchoring and adjustment heuristic:differential processing of self-generate and experimenter-provided anchors;8. Self anchoring in conversation: why language users don't do what they'should'; 9. Inferential correction; 10. Mental contamination and thedebiasing problem; 11. Sympathetic magical thinking: the contagion andsimilarity 'heuristics'; 12. Compatibility effects in judgment and choice;13. The weighing of evidence and the determinants of confidence; 14. Insidethe planning fallacy: the causes and consequences of optimistic timepredictions; 15. Probability judgment across cultures; 16. Durability bias inaffective forecasting; 17. Resistance of personal risk perceptions todebiasing interventions; 18. Ambiguity and self-evaluation: the role ofidiosyncratic trait definitions in self-serving assessments of ability; 19.When predictions fail: the dilemma of unrealistic optimism; 20. Norm theory:comparing reality to its alternatives; 21. Counterfactual thought, regret,and superstition: how to avoid kicking yourself; Part II. New TheoreticalDirections: 22. Two systems of reasoning; 23. The affect heuristic; 24.Individual differences in reasoning: implications for the rationalitydebate?; 25. Support theory: a nonextensional representation of subjectiveprobability; 26. Unpacking, repacking, and anchoring: advances in supporttheory; 27. Remarks on support theory: recent advances and future directions;28. The use of statistical heuristics in everyday inductive reasoning; 29.Feelings as information: moods influence judgments and processing strategies;30. Automated choice heuristics; 31. How good are fast and frugalheuristics?; 32. Intuitive politicians, theologians, and prosecutors:exploring the empirical implications of deviant functionalist metaphors; PartIII. Real World Applications: 33. The hot hand in basketball: on themisperception of random sequences; 34. Like goes with like: the role ofrepresentativeness in erroneous and pseudoscientific beliefs; 35. When lessis more: counterfactual thinking and satisfaction among Olympic medalists;36. Understanding misunderstanding: social psychological perspectives; 37.Assessing uncertainty in physical constants; 38. Do analysts overreact?; 39.The calibration of expert judgment: Heuristics and biases beyond thelaboratory; 40. Clinical versus actuarial judgment; 41. Heuristics and biasesin application; 42. Theory driven reasoning about plausible pasts andprobable futures in world politics.