内容

目次

Volume I: Motives and methods - Microeconomic systems as an experimentalscience, Vernon L. Smith (1982); Will economics become an experimentalscience?, Charles R. Plott (1991); Economics and ecology - A comparison ofexperimental methodologies and philosophies, Jason F. Shogren and CliffordNowell (1992); Let's keep the con out of experimental econ - A methodologicalnote, Alvin E. Roth (1994); Progress in behavioral game theory, Colin F.Camerer (1997); Environmental risk: Measuring Utility by a Single-ResponseSequential Method, Gordon M. Becker, Morris H. DeGroot and Jacob Marschak(1964); Economic theory of choice and the preference reversal phenomenon,David M. Grether and Charles R. Plott (1979); Prospect theory - An analysisof decision under risk, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1979); The framingof decisions and the psychology of choice, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman(1981); Do biases in probability judgment matter in markets?, Colin F.Camerer (1987); Experimental Evidence: Risk, ambiguity, and insurance, RobinM. Hogarth and Howard Kunreuther (1989); The impact of self-protection andself-insurance on individual response to risk, Jason F. Shogren (1990); Theendowment effect, loss aversion, and status quo bias, Daniel Kahneman, JackL. Knetsch and Richard H. Thaler (1991); Insurance for low-probabilityhazards - A bimodal response to unlikely events, Gary H. McClelland, WilliamD. Schulze and Don L. Coursey (1993); Investigating generalizations ofexpected utility theory using experimental data, John D. Hey and Chris Orme(1994); Environmental conflict: An empirical approach to the prisoners'dilemma game, Lester B. Lave (1962); Probabilistic destruction of common-poolresources: Experimental evidence, James M. Walker and Roy Gardner (1992);Communication in coordination games, Russell Cooper, Douglas V. DeJong,Robert Forsythe and Thomas W. Ross (1992); An experimental study of thecentipede game, Richard D. McKelvey and Thomas R. Palfrey (1992); Repeatedplay, cooperation and coordination: An experimental study, Thomas R. Palfreyand Howard Rosenthal (1994); The role of communication in resolving commonsdilemmas - Experimental evidence with heterogeneous appropriators, StevenHackett, Edella Schlager and James Walker (1994); Mitigating the tragedy ofthe commons through cooperation - An experimental evaluation, Charles F.Mason and Owen R. Phillips (1997); Endogenous timing in a gaming tournament,Kyung Hwan Baik, Todd L. Cherry, Stephan Kroll and Jason F. Shogren (1999).Volume II: Environmental cooperation: The coase theorem - Some experimentaltests, Elizabeth Hoffman and Matthew L. Spitzer (1982); Experimentalevaluation of the coase theorem, Glenn W. Harrison and Michael McKee (1985);Coasian solutions to the externality problem in experimental markets, GlennW. Harrison, Elizabeth Hoffman, E.E. Rutstrom and Matthew L. Spitzer (1987).