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Volume 1: Part 1 Allocative and technical inefficiency: the effects ofunions of resource allocation, Albert Rees; do union members receivecompensating wage differentials?, Greg J. Duncan and Frank P. Stafford; tradeunion power, threat effects and the extent of organization, S. Rosen; theeffects of unionization on the distribution of income - a general equilibriumapproach, Harry G. Johnson and Peter Mieszkowski; investment and wages in theabsence of binding contracts - a Nash bargaining approach, Paul A. Grout.Part 2 Unions as efficiency enhancing: the two faces of unionism, Richard B.Freemand and James L. Medoff; an agency theory of unionism, Roger L. Faithand Joseph D. Reid, Jr. Part 3 Union bargaining power and membership: theproduction process in a competitive economy - Walrasian, neo-Hobbesian andMarxian models, Samuel Bowles; the free rider problem and a social custommodel of trade union membership, Alison L. Booth; union membership and wagebargaining when membership is not compulsory, Alison L. Booth and MonojitChatterji; the determination of the union status of workers, Henry S. Farber.Part 4 Unions and imperfect competition: union-oligopoly bargaining, SteveDowrick; union wage differentials, product market influences and the divisionof rents, Mark B. Stewart; product markets and labour markets, StephenNickell. Part 5 Modelling union behaviour: the economic theory of tradeunions - an introductory survey, Andrew J. Oswald; individual preferences andunion wage determination - the case of the United Mine workers, Henry S.Farber; labour union objectives and collective bargaining, Douglas H. Blairand David L. Crawford; the Nash bargaining solution in economic modelling,Ken Binmore et al; the pure theory of the guaranteed annual wage contract,Wassily Leontief; wage bargaining and employment, Ian M. McDonald and RobertM. Solow; testing between competing models of wage and employmentdetermination in unionized markets, Thomas E. McCardy and John H. Pencavel;an integration of trade union models in a sequential bargaining framework,Alan Manning; work rules, featherbedding and pareto-optimal union-managementbargaining, George E. Johnson; seniority and distribution in a two-workertrade union, Petr Kuhn and Jacques Robert. Part 6 Unions and strikes:bargaining with private information, John Kennan and Robert Wilson; anempirical test of an asymmetric information model of strikes, Joseph S.Tracy. Part 7 Choice of bargaining structure: worker substitutability andpatterns of unionization, Henrik Horn and Asher Wolinsky; non-cooperativebargaining and union formation, Byoung Heon Jun. Volume 2: the economiceffects of unions; unions and hours of work; public sector unionism; unionsand the macro-economy; unions and foreign direct investment. (Part contents).