【O.ウィリアムソン他編『取引コストの経済学』】
The Economics of Transaction Costs (An Elgar Critical Writings Reader) '99
内容
目次
Part 1 Background: the nature of the firm, R.H. Coase; the verticalintegration of production - market failure considerations, Oliver E.Williamson; production, information costs, and economic organization, ArmenA. Alchian, Harold Demsetz; industrial organization - a proposal forresearch, R.H. Coase. Part 2 Apparatus: vertical integration, appropriablerents, and the competitive contracting process, Benjamin Klein et al;comparative economic organization - the analysis of discrete structuralalternatives, Oliver E. Williamson; credible commitments - using hostages tosupport exchange, Oliver E. Williamson; the limits of firms - incentive andbureaucratic features, Oliver E. Williamson; the costs and benefits ofownership - a theory of vertical and lateral integration, Sanford J.Grossman, Oliver D. Hart; multitask principal-agent analyses - incentivecontracts, asset ownership, and the job design, Bengt Holmstrom, PaulMilgrom. Part 3 Applications: integration of the sales force - an empiricalexamination, Erin Anderson, David C. Schmittlein; the costs of organization,Scott E. Masten et al; contracts and specific investment - an empirical testof transaction cost theory, Bruce R. Lyons; contract duration andrelationship-specific investments - empirical evidence from coal markets,Paul L. Joskow; quantity and price adjustment in long-term contracts - a casestudy of petroleum coke, Victor P, Goldberg, John R. Erickson; efficientadaptation in long-term contracts - take-or-pay provisions for natural gas,Scott E. Masten, Keith J. Crocker; the economics of block booking, Roy W.Kennedey, Benjamin Klein; franchise bidding for natural monopolies -ingeneral and with respect to CATV, Oliver E. Williamson; regulation andadministered contracts, Victor P. Goldberg; the institutional foundations ofregulatory commitment - a comparative analyses of telecommunicationsregulation, Brian Levy, Pablo T. Spiller; the industrial organization ofCongress - or, why legislatures, like Firs, are not organized as markets,Barry R. Weingast, William J. Marshall.
カート
カートに商品は入っていません。