目次

Introduction 1; 1. The enactive approach to affective intentionality 1;2. Some preliminary predictions of enactivism 9; 3. The "curious" emotions14; 4. Conceptualizing action versus reaction 18; 5. Plan of the book 21;Chapter 1; Preconscious emotional intentionality 25; 1. Motivation, consciousemotion, and unconscious emotion 27; 2. The murkiness of emotionalintentionality 31; 3. Aims, objects, triggers, and symbolization-vehicles 33;4. The roles of sensation, interoception, and sensorimotor action imagery 42;Chapter 2; Motivated attention in action: How emotion creates consciousintentionality 47; 1. Linear versus dynamical causal sequences in the brain52; 2. Conflicting theories with conflicting empirical predictions 57; 3. TheP300 ERP as an operational definition of perceptual consciousness 63; 4. Howthe Mack and Rock data relate to the two types of hypotheses 63; 5. Theparadox of early and late selection 69; 6. Attention and conscious processing72; 7. Further implications for the problems of attention and consciousness73; Chapter 3; Non-consummatory motivations: Extropy and "life wish" in theself-organization of emotion 79; 1. Intertheoretic reduction andconsummatory-drive reductionism 82; 2. The notion of "extropy": Anon-reductive force? 89; 3. The humanistic notion of "life wish" 95; 4. Apossible synthesis 99; Chapter 4; Homeostasis, extropy, and boundary needs asgrounding specific emotions 103; 1. Physiological evidence fornon-consummatory motivation 104; 2. Novelty, constraints to freedom, and theaction-consciousness connection 115; 3. The importance of extropy needs inhigher mammals 124; 4. Existential requirements for an adequate dynamicaltheory of emotion 125; 5. Toward an integrated physiological andphenomenological account 128; Chapter 5; Varieties of extended self andpersonality 131; 1. How emotion grounds the various senses of self 138; 2.Why not an illusory-choice model? 142; 3. The embodied self and thepersonality 152; 4. How can there be knowledge of the self? 159; Chapter 6;Learning about emotions through the arts 167; 1. An enactive dance form forthe eye 171; 2. Why does art move, and not just entertain? 176; 3. Love andother non-consummatory motivations 181; Chapter 7; Dynamical systems andemotional agency: A closer look 191; 1. The causal power of dynamical systems195; 2. How can top-down systems avoid violating causal closure? 202; 3. Theemotional brain as an enactive system 209; 4. Objections and responses 211;Conclusion 217; References 225;