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目次

List of Figures and Tables What Is Game Theory? What Can You Do withGame Theory? Four Problems in Political Science Why Model? The RationalChoice Approach to Social Modeling Ch. 2Utility Theory The Concept ofRationality How Do Utility Functions Predict Actions? An Example: Nixon'sChristmas Bombing Certainty, Risk, and Uncertainty Utility Theory under theCondition of Risk Some Common Misconceptions about Utility Theory UtilityFunctions and Types of Preferences A Simple Example: The Calculus ofDeterrence Another Simple Example: The Decision to Vote Why Might UtilityTheory Not Work? Ch. 3Specifying a Game Formalizing a Situation: Deterrencein the Cuban Missile Crisis Games in Extensive Form Games in Strategic FormCh. 4Classical Game Theory Defining the Terms of Classical Game TheoryDomination, Best Replies, and Equilibrium Mixed Strategies The Minmax Theoremand Equilibria of Two-Person, Zero-Sum Games Characteristics of NashEquilibria Nash Equilibria and Common Conjectures Rationalizability PoliticalReform in Democracies Candidate Competition in the Spatial Model of ElectionsA Very Brief Introduction to Cooperative Game Theory Ch. 5SolvingExtensive-Form Games: Backwards Induction and Subgame Perfection BackwardsInduction Subgame Perfection Sophisticated Voting Agenda Control LegislativeRules and Structure-Induced Equilibria The Rubinstein Bargaining ModelBargaining in Legislatures Why Might Backwards Induction YieldCounterintuitive Results? Ch. 6Beliefs and Perfect Bayesian EquilibriaBayes's Theorem The Preference for Biased Information Perfect BayesianEquilibria Nuclear Deterrence Ch. 7More on Noncooperative Equilibrium:Perfect and Sequential Equilibria Elimination of Weakly Dominated StrategiesPerfect Equilibrium Sequential Equilibrium Deterrence and the Signaling ofResolve "Why Vote?" Redux Ch. 8Games of Limited Information and Restrictionson Beliefs Signaling Games The Informational Role of Congressional CommitteesBargaining under Incomplete Information Deterrence and Out-of-EquilibriumBeliefs An Introduction to Restrictions on Beliefs "Cheap Talk" andCoordination Ch. 9Repeated Games Thinking about Repetition: IteratedPrisoner's Dilemma Folk Theorems Finite Repeated Games: The Chain StoreParadox Stationarity Retrospective Voting and Electoral Control Ch.10Conclusion: Where Do We Go from Here? How Do Formal Models Increase OurKnowledge? The Weaknesses of Game Theory How Does One Build a Model? Appendix1: Basic Mathematical Knowledge Algebra Set Theory Relations and FunctionsProbability Theory Limits Differential Calculus Partial Derivatives andLagrange Multipliers Integral Calculus The Idea of a Mathematical ProofAppendix 2: Answers to Selected Problems Notes Glossary of Terms in GameTheory Bibliography Index