内容

目次

Preface xiii Chapter 1: Decision Theory and Human Behavior 1 1.1Beliefs, Preferences, and Constraints 4 1.2 The Meaning of Rational Action 61.3 Why Are Preferences Consistent? 7 1.4 Time Inconsistency 8 1.5Bayesian Rationality and Subjective Priors 11 1.6 The Biological Basis forExpected Utility 16 1.7 The Allais and Ellsberg Paradoxes 16 1.8 Risk andthe Shape of the Utility Function 18 1.9 Prospect Theory 21 1.10 Heuristicsand Biases in Decision Making 26 Chapter 2: Game Theory: Basic Concepts30 2.1 The Extensive Form 30 2.2 The Normal Form 33 2.3 Mixed Strategies34 2.4 Nash Equilibrium 35 2.5 The Fundamental Theorem of Game Theory 362.6 Solving for Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria 37 2.7 Throwing Fingers 382.8 The Battle of the Sexes 38 2.9 The Hawk-Dove Game 39 2.10 ThePrisoner's Dilemma 40 2.11 Alice, Bob, and the Choreographer 41 2.12 AnEfficiency-Enhancing Choreographer 43 2.13 The Correlated EquilibriumSolution Concept 44 Chapter 3: Game Theory and Human Behavior 45 3.1Self- and Other-Regarding Preferences 46 3.2 Methodological Issues inBehavioral Game Theory 49 3.3 An Anonymous Market Exchange 52 3.4 TheRationality of Altruistic Giving 54 3.5 Conditional Altruistic Cooperation56 3.6 Altruistic Punishment 57 3.7 Strong Reciprocity in the Labor Market59 3.8 Altruistic Third-Party Punishment 61 3.9 Altruism and Cooperation inGroups 64 3.10 Inequality Aversion 68 3.11 The Trust Game 71 3.12Character Virtues 73 3.13 The Situational Character of Preferences 75 3.14The Dark Side of Altruistic Cooperation 77 3.15 Norms of Cooperation:Cross-Cultural Variation 78 Chapter 4: Rationalizability and CommonKnowledge of Rationality 83 4.1 Epistemic Games 83 4.2 A Simple EpistemicGame 86 4.3 An Epistemic Battle of the Sexes 87 4.4 Dominated andIteratedly Dominated Strategies 88 4.5 Eliminating Weakly DominatedStrategies 89 4.6 Rationalizable Strategies 90 4.7 Eliminating StronglyDominated Strategies 92 4.8 Common Knowledge of Rationality 93 4.9Rationalizability and Common Knowledge of Rationality 94 4.10 The BeautyContest 94 4.11 The Traveler's Dilemma 95 4.12 The Modified Traveler'sDilemma 96 4.13 Global Games 98 4.14 CKR Is an Event, Not a Premise 100Chapter 5: Extensive Form Rationalizability 102 5.1 Backward Induction andDominated Strategies 102 5.2 Subgame Perfection 104 5.3 Subgame Perfectionand Incredible Threats 105 5.4 The Surprise Examination 105 5.5 The CommonKnowledge of Logicality Paradox 106 5.6 The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma 1075.7 The Centipede Game 108 5.8 CKR Fails Off the Backward Induction Path 1105.9 How to Play the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma 112 5.10 The Modal Logic ofKnowledge 114 5.11 Backward Induction and Extensive Form CKR 115 5.12Rationality and Extensive Form CKR 118 5.13 On the Nonexistence of CKR 119Chapter 6: The Mixing Problem: Purification and Conjectures 121 6.1 WhyPlay Mixed Strategies? 121 6.2 Harsanyi's Purification Theorem 123 6.3 AReputational Model of Honesty and Corruption 125 6.4 Purifying Honesty andCorruption 128 6.5 Epistemic Games: Mixed Strategies as Conjectures 128 6.6Resurrecting the Conjecture Approach to Purification 129 Chapter 7:Bayesian Rationality and Social Epistemology 132 7.1 The Sexes: From Battleto Ballet 133 7.2 The Choreographer Trumps Backward Induction 134 7.3Property Rights and Correlated Equilibrium 135 7.4 Convention as CorrelatedEquilibrium 136 7.5 Correlated Strategies and Correlated Equilibria 136 7.6Correlated Equilibrium and Bayesian Rationality 138 7.7 The SocialEpistemology of Common Priors 139 7.8 The Social Epistemology of CommonKnowledge 141 7.9 Social Norms 143 7.10 Game Theory and the Evolution ofNorms 143 7.11 The Merchants' Wares 144 Chapter 8: Common Knowledge andNash Equilibrium 146 8.1 Conditions for a Nash Equilibrium in Two-PlayerGames 146 8.2 A Three-Player Counterexample 147 8.3 The Modal Logic ofCommon Knowledge 149 8.4 The Commonality of Knowledge 152 8.5 The TactfulLadies 153 8.6 The Tactful Ladies and the Commonality of Knowledge 156 8.7Agreeing to Disagree 158 8.8 The Demise of Methodological Individualism 161Chapter 9: Reflective Reason and Equilibrium Refinements 164 9.1Perfect, Perfect Bayesian, and Sequential Equilibria 166 9.2 IncredibleThreats 167 9.3 Unreasonable Perfect Bayesian Equilibria 170 9.4 The LBRcriterion picks out the sequential equilibrium 171 9.5 Selten's Horse:Sequentiality vs. the LBR criterion 171 9.6 The Spence Signaling Model 1739.7 Irrelevant Node Additions 174 9.8 Improper Sequential Equilibria 1759.9 Second-Order Forward Induction 176 9.10 Beer and Quiche Without theIntuitive Criterion 177 9.11 An Unreasonable Perfect Equilibrium 178 9.12The Principle of Insufficient Reason 179 9.13 The Principle of HonestCommunication 179 9.14 Induction: Forward is Robust, Backward is Fragile 180Chapter 10: The Analytics of Human Sociality 181 10.1 ExplainingCooperation: An Overview 181 10.2 Bob and Alice Redux 183 10.3 The FolkTheorem 185 10.4 The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information 18810.5 Cooperation with Private Signaling 193 10.6 One Cheer For the FolkTheorem 195 10.7 Altruistic Punishing in the Public Goods Game 197 10.8 TheFailure of Models of Self-Regarding Cooperation 200 Chapter 11: TheEvolution of Property Rights 201 11.1 The Endowment Effect 201 11.2Territoriality 204 11.3 Property Rights in Young Children 207 11.4 Respectfor Possession in Nonhuman Animals 207 11.5 Conditions for a PropertyEquilibrium 210 11.6 Property and Antiproperty Equilibria 213 11.7 AnAntiproperty Equilibrium 217 11.8 Property Rights as Choreographer 220Chapter 12: The Unification of the Behavioral Sciences 221 12.1 Gene-CultureCoevolution: The Biological Model 223 12.2 Culture and Physiology of HumanCommunication 228 12.3 Biological and Cultural Dynamics 229 12.4 The Theoryof Norms: The Sociological Model 231 12.5 Socialization and theInternalization of Norms 233 12.6 Rational Choice: The Economic Model 23412.7 Deliberative Choice: The Psychological Model 236 12.8 Application:Addictive Behavior 238 12.9 Game Theory: The Universal Lexicon of Life 23912.10 Epistemic Game Theory and Social Norms 240 12.11 Society as a ComplexAdaptive System 242 12.12 Counterpoint: Biology 244 12.13 Counterpoint:Economics 245 12.14 Counterpoint: Psychology 245 12.15 The BehavioralDisciplines Can Be Unified 247 Chapter 13: Summary 248 Chapter 14:Table of Symbols 250 References 253 Index 283