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VOLUME 1: SOCIAL CHOICE AND EQUILIBRIUM Part 1: Social Choice On theRationale of Group Decision-making - Duncan Black A Direct Proof of Arrow's Theorem - Julian H. Blau A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions -Amaryta Sen Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result - AllanGibbard Part 2: Equilibrium A Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibilityunder Majority Rule - Charles R. Plott Intransitivities inMultidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control -Richard D. McKelvey Generic Instability of Majority Rule - NormanSchofield Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for theStudy of Institutions - William H. Riker On 64%-Majority Rule - AndrewCaplin and Barry Nalebuff Covering, Dominance, and Institution FreeProperties of Social Choice - Richard D McKelvey The Uncovered Set and theCore - Gary C. Cox Bargaining in Legislatures - David P. Baron and JohnFerejohn A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice - Jeffrey S. Banks andJohn Duggan Part 3: Electoral Systems Electoral Equilibrium underAlternative Voting Institutions - Gary Cox A Voting Model ImplyingDuverger's Law and Positive Turnout - Timothy J. Fedderson Party Formationand Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems - Massimo MorelliVOLUME 2: VOTING, ELECTIONS AND PRESSURE POLITICS Part 4: Voting andElections A Theory of the Calculus of Voting - William H. Riker and PeterC. Ordeshook Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty - Thomas R.Palfrey and Howard Rosenthal The Swing Voter's Curse - Timothy J.Fedderson and Wolfgang Pesendorfer Voting as Communicating - ThomasPickety The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model - Robert J. BarroIncumbent Performance and Electoral Control - John Ferejohn Robustness ofthe Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidate motivations, uncertainty andconvergence - Randall L. Calvert Credibility and Policy Convergence in aTwo Party System with Rational Voters - Alberto Alesina An Economic Modelof Representative Democracy - Timothy Besley and Stephen Coate A DynamicalModel of Political Equilibrium - Gerald H. Kramer Elections, Coalitions,and Outcomes - David Austin-Smith and Jeffrey S. Banks Elections,Governments and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems PressurePolitics - David P. Baron and Daniel Diermeier Part 5: Pressure PoliticsThe Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft - Gordon Tullock ThePolitical Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society - Anne O. Krueger A Theoryof Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence - Gary BeckerOn the Form of Transfers to Special Interests - Stephen Coates and StephenMorris Legislators and Interest Groups: How unorganized interests getrepresented - Arthur T. Denzau and Michael C. Munger Protection for Sale -Gene Grossman and Elhanen Helpman The Independent Judiciary in an InterestGroup Perspective - William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner VOLUME 3:LEGISLATURES Part 6: Bureaucracy Sophisticated Sincerity: Voting overendogenous agendas - David Austen-Smith Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power ofCommittees: An analysis of sincere and sophisticated behavior - Arthur T.Denzau and Robert J. Mackay Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote ofConfidence Procedure - Daniel Diermeier and Timothy J. FeddersonBicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization ofLegislatures - Daniel Diermeier and Roger B. Myerson Sophisticated Votingand Agenda Independence in the Distributive Politics Setting - John Ferejohn,Fiorina P. Morris and Richard D. McKelvey Collective Decision Making andStanding Committee: An informational rationale for restrictive amendmentprocedures - Thomas W. Gilligan and Keith Krehbiel Buying Supermajorities- Timothy Groseclose and James Snyder Where's the Party? - Keith KrehbielOn Division of the Question - John B. Kadane Coalitions and CabinetGovernment - Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle Committee Design withEndogenous Information - Nicola Persico Political Resource Allocation,Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo - Thomas Romer and Howard RosenthalModelling the Interaction of Parties, Activists and Voters: Why is thepolitical center empty? - Norman Schofield and Itai Sened InstitutionalArrangements and Equilibrium in Multi-dimensional Voting Models - Kenneth A.Shepsle The Industrial Organization of Congress - Barry R. Weingast andWilliam J. Marshall VOLUME 4: BUREAUCRACY, CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS ANDTHE STATE Part 7: Bureaucracy Agency Budgets, Cost Information, andAuditing - Jeffrey S. Banks Bureaucratic Expertise versus LegislativeAuthority: A model of deception and monitoring in budgeting - JonathanBendor, Serge Taylor and Roland Van Gaalen Delegation and the Structure ofPolicy-Making: A transactions cost politics approach - David Epstein andSharyn O'Halloren Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy - John Ferejohnand Charles Shipan Administrative Procedures as Instruments of PoliticalControl - Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll and Barry R. WeingastCongressional Oversight Overlooked: Police patrols versus fire alarms -Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz Part 8: Constitutional ArrangementsThe Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-preserving federalismand economic development - Barry R. Weingast A Pure Theory of LocalExpenditures - Charles M. Tiebout An Economic Theory of Clubs - James M.Buchanan The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in government - EricMaskin and Jean Tirole Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto playersand presidentialism, parliamentarism, multi-cameralism, and multipartism -George Tsebelis Part 9: The State Dictatorship, Democracy and Development- Mancur Olson Constitutions and Commitment: The evolution of institutionsgoverning public choice in seventeenth century england - Douglas C. North andBarry R. Weingast Coordination, Commitment and Enforcement: The case ofthe merchant guild - Anver Greif, Paul Milgrom and Barry R. Weingast ARational Theory of the Size of Government - Allan H. Meltzer and Scott F.Richard Comparative Politics and Public Finance - Torsten Persson, GerardRoland and Guido Tabellini A Theory of Political Transitions - DaronAcemoglu and James A. Robinson Comparative Politics and Public Finance -Torsten Persson, Gerard Roland and Guido Tabellini A Theory of PoliticalTransitions - Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson