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Contents: Foreword Donato Masciandaro and Marc Quintyn IntroductionCharles Goodhart PART I: INDEPENDENCE, ACCOUNTABILITY AND GOVERNANCE 1.Robust Regulators and their Political Masters: Independence andAccountability in Theory Marc Quintyn and Michael Taylor 2. Independenceand Accountability in Supervision: General Principles and European SettingsLorenzo Bini Smaghi 3. The Fear of Freedom: Politicians and the Independenceand Accountability of Financial Supervisors in Practice Marc Quintyn, SilviaRamirez and Michael Taylor 4. Independence and Accountability: Why PoliticsMatters Johnathan Westrup 5. Governance in Banking Supervision: Theory andPractices Marco Arnone, Salim Darbar and Alessandro Gambini PART II: THEDESIGN OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: CAUSES AND EFFECTS 6. FinancialSupervision Architectures and Central Bank Independence Andreas Freytag andDonato Masciandaro 7. Architectures of Supervisory Authorities and BankingSupervision Marco Arnone and Alessandro Gambini 8. Experience withIntegrated Supervisors: Governance and Quality of Supervision Martin ?ihakand Richard Podpiera 9. Financial Supervisors: Alternative Models in aEuropean Perspective Giorgio Di Giorgio and Carmine di Noia 10. BudgetaryGovernance of Banking Supervision: A Primer Maria Nieto, Henriette Prast andDonato Masciandaro PART III: IN SEARCH FOR THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS 11.Bureaucrats or Politicians? Alberto Alesina and Guido Tabellini 12. AgencyProblems in Banking Supervision Robert Eisenbeis Index