内容

目次

1Static Games of Complete Information 1.1Basic Theory: Narmal-Form Gamesand Nash Equilibrium 1.1.ANormal-Form Representation of Games 1.1.BIteratedElimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies 1.1.CMotivation and Definitionof Nash Equilibriuin 1.2Applications 1.2.ACournot Model of Duopoly1.2.BBertrand Model of Duopoly 1.2.CFinal-Offer Arbitration 1.2.DThe Problemof the Commons 1.3Advanced Theory: Mixed Strategies and Existence ofEquilibriutn 1.3.AMixed Strategies 1.3.BExistence of Nash Equilibrium2Dynamic Games of Complete Information 2.1Dynamic Games of Complete andPerfect Information 2.1.ATheory: Backwards Induction 2.1.BStackelberg Modelof Duopoly 2.1.CWages and Employment in a Unionized Firm 2.1.DSequentialBargaining 2.2Two-Stage Games of Complete but Imperfect Information2.2.ATheory: Subgame Perfection 2.2.BBank Runs 2.2.CTariffs and ImperfectInternational Competition 2.2.DTournaments 2.3Repeated Games 2.3.ATheory:Two-Stage Repeated Games 2.3.BTheory: Infinitely Repeated Games2.3.CCollusion between Cournot Duopolists 2.3.DEfficiency Wages2.3.ETime-Consistent Monetary Policy 2.4Dynamic Games of Complete butImperfect Information 2.4.AExtensive-Form Representation of Games2.4.BSubgame-Perfect Nash Equilibriuin 3Static Games of IncompleteInformation 3.1Theory: Static Bayesian Ganies and Bayesian Nash Equilibrium3.1.AAn Example: Cournot Competition under Asymmetric Information3.1.BNormal-Form Representation of Static Bayesian Games 3.1.CDefinition ofBayesian Nash Equilibrium 3.2Applications 3.2.AMixed Strategies Revisited3.2.BAn Auction 3.2.CA Double Auction 3.3The Revelation Principle 4DynamicGames of Incomplete Information 4.1Introduction to Perfect BayesianEquilibrium 4.2Signaling Games 4.2.APerfect Bayesian Equilibrium in SignalingGames 4.2.BJob-Market Signaling 4.2.CCorporate Investment and CapitalStructure 4.2.DMonetary Policy 4.3Other Applications of Perfect BayesianEquilibrium 4.3.ACheap-Talk Games 4.3.BSequential Bargaining under AsymmetricInformation 4.3.CReputation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemnia4.4Refinements of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Index