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Contents: Introduction David Martimort PART I COLLECTIVE DECISION PROBLEMS UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION A. Public Goods and the Free Riding Problem 1. Claude d'Aspremont and Louis-Andre Gerard-Varet (1979), `Incentives and Incomplete Information', Journal of Public Economics, 11 (1), February, 25-45 2. Jerry Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont (1977), 'Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods', Econometrica, 45 (2), March, 427-38 3. Theodore Groves (1973), `Incentives in Teams', Econometrica, 41 (4), July, 617-31 4. Jean-Jacques Laffont and Eric Maskin (1979), `A Differential Approach to Expected Utility Maximizing Mechanisms', in Jean-Jacques Laffont (ed.), Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences: Studies in Public Economics Volume 2, Part IV, Chapter 16, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, New York, NY, USA and Oxford, UK: North-Holland Publishing Company, 289-308 5. Jean-Jacques Laffont and Eric Maskin (1980), `A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms', Econometrica, 48 (6), September, 1507-20 6. George J. Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite (1990), `Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents', Review of Economic Studies, 57 (3), July, 351-67 B. Incentive Compatibility and the Revelation Principle 7. Allan Gibbard (1973), `Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result', Econometrica, 41 (4), July, 587-601 8. Partha Dasgupta, Peter Hammond and Eric Maskin (1979), `The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility', Review of Economic Studies, 46 (2), April, 185-216 9. Roger B. Myerson (1979), `Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem', Econometrica, 47 (1), January, 61-73 10. Roger B. Myerson (1982), `Optimal Coordination Mechanisms in Generalized Principal-Agent Problems', Journal of Mathematical Economics, 10 (1), June, 67-81 C. Full Implementation 11. Joel S. Demski and David Sappington (1984), `Optimal Incentive Contracts with Multiple Agents', Journal of Economic Theory, 33 (1), June 152-71 12. Eric Maskin (1999), `Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality', Review of Economic Studies, Special Issue: Contracts, 66 (1), January, 23-38 13. Eric Maskin and John Moore (1999), `Implementation and Renegotiation', Review of Economic Studies, Special Issue: Contracts, 66 (1), January, 39-56 14. John Moore and Rafael Repullo (1988), `Subgame Perfect Implementation', Econometrica, 56 (5), September, 1191-1220 15. John Moore and Rafael Repullo (1990), `Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization', Econometrica, 58 (5), September, 1083-99 16. Thomas R. Palfrey and Sanjay Srivastava (1989), `Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies', Econometrica, 57 (1), January, 115-34 17. Dilip Mookherjee and Stefan Reichelstein (1990), `Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms', Review of Economic Studies, 57 (3), July, 453-75 D. Interim Efficiency 18. Bengt Holmstrom and Roger B. Myerson (1983), `Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information', Econometrica, 51 (6), November, 1799-1819 19. John O. Ledyard and Thomas R. Palfrey (1999), `A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods', Econometrica, 67 (2), March, 435-48 E. Auctions 20. Jacques Cremer and Richard P. McLean (1988), `Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions', Econometrica, 56 (6), November, 1247-57 21. Philippe Jehiel and Benny Moldovanu (2001), `Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations', Econometrica, 69 (5), September, 1237-59 22. Eric Maskin and John Riley (1989), `Optimal Multi-unit Auctions', in Frank Hahn (ed.), The Economics of Missing Markets, Information, and Games, Chapter 14, Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 312-35 23. Roger B. Myerson (1981), `Optimal Auction Design', Mathematics of Operations Research, 6 (1), February, 58-73 24. John G. Riley and William F. Samuelson (1981), `Optimal Auctions', American Economic Review, 71 (3), June, 381-92 F. Robust Mechanism Design 25. Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris (2005), `Robust Mechanism Design', Econometrica, 73 (6), November, 1771-1813 26. Philippe Jehiel, Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn, Benny Moldovanu and William R. Zame (2006), `The Limits of Ex Post Implementation', Econometrica, 74 (3), May, 585-610 27. Dilip Mookherjee and Stefan Reichelstein (1992), `Dominant Strategy Implementation of Bayesian Incentive Compatible Allocation Rules', Journal of Economic Theory, 56 (2), April, 378-99 28. Zvika Neeman (2004), `The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design', Journal of Economic Theory, 117 (1), July, 55-77 29. Robert Wilson (1987), `Game-Theoretic Analyses of Trading Processes', in Truman F. Bewley (ed.), Advances in Economic Theory: Fifth World Congress, Chapter 2, Cambridge, UK, New York, NY, USA and Melbourne, Australia: Cambridge University Press, 33-70 G. The Coase Theorem under Asymmetric Information: Scope and Value 30. Roger B. Myerson and Mark A. Satterthwaite (1983), `Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading', Journal of Economic Theory, 29 (2), April, 265-81 31. Peter Cramton, Robert Gibbons and Paul Klemperer (1987), `Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently', Econometrica, 55 (3), May, 615-32, 1493 (Erratum) 32. Steven R. Williams (1999), `A Characterization of Efficient, Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms', Economic Theory, 14 (1), July, 155-8 PART II COLLECTIVE DECISION PROBLEMS UNDER MORAL HAZARD A. Moral Hazard in Teams 33. Bengt Holmstrom (1982), `Moral Hazard in Teams', Bell Journal of Economics, 13 (2), Autumn, 324-40 34. Patrick Legros and Steven A. Matthews (1993), `Efficient and Nearly-Efficient Partnerships', Review of Economic Studies, 60 (3), July, 599-611 35. Eric Rasmusen (1987), `Moral Hazard in Risk-Averse Teams', RAND Journal of Economics, 18 (3), Autumn, 428-35 36. David Rahman (2012), `But Who Will Monitor the Monitor?', American Economic Review, 102 (6), October, 2767-97 B. The Firm as a Hierarchy: Relative or Joint Performance Evaluations? 37. Yeon-Koo Che and Seung-Weon Yoo (2001), `Optimal Incentives for Teams', American Economic Review, 91 (3), June, 525-41 38. Edward P. Lazear and Sherwin Rosen (1981), `Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts', Journal of Political Economy, 89 (5), October, 841-64 39. Hideshi Itoh (1991), `Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations', Econometrica, 59 (3), May, 611-36 40. Dilip Mookherjee (1984), `Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents', Review of Economic Studies, LI (3), July, 433-46 41. Barry J. Nalebuff and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1983), `Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition', Bell Journal of Economics, 14 (1), Spring, 21-43 42. Ching-To Ma (1988), `Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents', Review of Economic Studies, LV (4), October, 555-71 Volume II Contents: Introduction An introduction by the editor appears in Volume I PART I COLLECTIVE DECISION PROBLEMS: INCOMPLETE CONTRACTING AND THE NON-VERIFIABILITY PARADIGM A. Property Rights, Authority and Capital Structure 1. Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton (1992), `An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting', Review of Economic Studies, 59 (3), July, 473-94 2. Philippe Aghion and Jean Tirole (1997), `Formal and Real Authority in Organizations', Journal of Political Economy, 105 (1), February, 1-29 3. Aaron S. Edlin and Stefan Reichelstein (1996), `Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment', American Economic Review, 86 (3), June, 478-501 4. Mathias Dewatripont and Jean Tirole (1994), `A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder Congruence', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109 (4), November, 1027-54 5. Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart (1986), `The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration', Journal of Political Economy, 94 (4), August, 691-719 6. Oliver Hart and John Moore (1990), `Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm', Journal of Political Economy, 98 (6), December, 1119-58 [40] 7. Jean Tirole (1986), `Procurement and Renegotiation', Journal of Political Economy, 94 (2), April, 235-59 B. The Foundations of Incomplete Contracts 8. Ilya Segal (1999), `Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts', Review of Economic Studies, Special Issue: Contracts, 66 (1), January, 57-82 9. Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole (1999), `Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts', Review of Economic Studies, Special Issue: Contracts, 66 (1), January, 83-114 C. Relational Contracts and Subjective Evaluations 10. Jonathan Levin (2003), `Relational Incentive Contracts', American Economic Review, 93 (3), June, 835-57 11. W. Bentley MacLeod and James M. Malcomson (1989), `Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment', Econometrica, 57 (2), March, 447-80 12. W. Bentley MacLeod (2003), `Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation', American Economic Review, 93 (1), March, 216-40 PART II COLLECTIVE DECISION PROBLEMS: THE MULTI-CONTRACTING ORGANIZATION A. Collusion: When Agents Share Information and Coordinate Actions 13. Hideshi Itoh (1993), `Coalitions, Incentives, and Risk Sharing', Journal of Economic Theory, 60 (2), August, 410-27 14. Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort (1999), `Separation of Regulators against Collusive Behavior', RAND Journal of Economics, 30 (2), Summer, 232-62 15. Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole (1991), `The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106 (4), November, 1089-1127 16. Jean Tirole (1986), `Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2 (2), Fall, 181-214 17. Hal R. Varian (1990), `Monitoring Agents With Other Agents', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 146 (1), March, 153-74 B. Collusion with Asymmetric and Soft Information 18. Yeon-Koo Che and