Are there objective moral facts, i.e. things that are morally right, wrong, good, or bad independently of what anybody thinks about them? To answer this question more and more scholars have recently begun to appeal to evidence from scientific disciplines such as psychology, neuroscience, evolutionary biology, and cultural anthropology. This book investigates this novel scientific approach in a comprehensive, empirically-focused, partly clarificatory, and partly meta-theoretical way. It argues for two main theses. First, it is possible for the empirical sciences to contribute to the moral realism/anti-realism debate. And second, most appeals to science that have so far been proposed are insufficiently empirically substantiated. The book's main chapters address four prominent science-based arguments for or against the existence of objective moral facts: the presumptive argument, the argument from moral disagreement, the sentimentalist argument, and the evolutionary debunking argument. For each of these arguments Thomas Polzler first identifies the sense in which their underlying empirical hypotheses would have to be true in order for these arguments to work, and then shows that the available scientific evidence fails to support them. Moreover, he also makes suggestions as to how to test these hypotheses in a more valid way. Moral Reality and the Empirical Sciences is an important contribution to the moral realism/anti-realism debate that will appeal both to philosophers and scientists interested in moral psychology and metaethics.