This book explores 25 years of international peacebuilding and recasts it as a crisis of confidence in universal ideas of peacebuilding and self-government. International peacebuilding is increasingly understood as an endogenous process which constrains external assistance and is, at the same time, a long-term process in which external supervision needs to be prolonged. The upshot of international aid, `the need to do less, but stay longer', is not perceived as a contradiction, but it is tainted by uncomfortable anxieties. In everyday parlance, these are expressed as follows: local people need to lead the process, but they cannot make it on their own; we, international agencies, need to stay longer, but we cannot really help them. These anxieties seem to reflect a growing estrangement with universal ideas of international intervention as much as with the possibility of self-government. Today, liberal peace is dying in agony and neither foreign practitioners nor local people seem ready for the ambitious task of peacebuilding. If peace still matters, the question needs to be confronted of how peacebuilding got here and where is it traveling? Since current peacebuilding interventions are abandoning top-down methodologies, and experimenting with locally driven strategies, the book has two suggestions. The first is that international policymakers are embracing some of the scholarly critiques of liberal peace. For more than a decade, academic critiques have pointed out the need to focus on everyday dynamics and local resistances to liberal peace in order to enable hybrid and long-term practice-based strategies of peacebuilding. Now, the distance between critiques and policy has narrowed: deferring peace - adjourning the end of peacebuilding - is becoming the alpha and omega of scholars and practitioners, confusing the former and humbling the latter. The second suggestion is that in stepping away from liberal peace, a transvaluation of peacebuilding values is afoot. Critiques are beginning to accept and valorise that international interventions will continuously fail to produce sensitive results. The earlier frustrations with unexpected setbacks, errors or contingencies are ebbing away. Instead, critiques normalise the failure to promote stability and peace. This book will be of much interest to students of peacebuilding, international intervention, conflict resolution, international organisations and security studies in general.