内容

目次

Part 1 Optimality overall: the economic theory of public enforcement,Polinsky and Shavell; the economics of enforcing air pollution controls,Downing and Watson; firm behaviour under imperfectly enforceable pollutionstandards and taxes, Harford; enforcement costs and the choice of policyinstruments for controlling pollution, Malik. Part 2 Elaboration of themes -the design of penalties: the structure of penalties in environmentalenforcement - an economic analysis, Segerson and Tietenberg; guilty untilproven innocent - regulation with costly and limited enforcement,Swierzbinski; garbage recycling, and illicit burning or dumping, Fullertonand Kinnaman. Part 3 Self-reporting discharges: self-reporting of pollutionand the firm's behaviour under imperfectly enforceable regulations, Harford;self-reporting and the design of policies for regulating stochasticpollution, Malik. Part 4 Extensions of the basic template - using "ex-post"liability: firm behaviour and regulatory control of stochastic environmentalwastes by probabilistic constraints, Beavis and Dobbs; uncertainty andincentives for nonpoint pollution control, Segerson. Part 5 Using theregulatory record: cooperation, deterrence, and the ecology of regulatoryenforcement, Scholz; game models for structuring monitoring and enforcementsystems, Russell; an integrated strategy to reduce monitoring and enforcementcosts, Hentschel and Randall. Part 6 Private and voluntary approaches:optimal standards with incomplete enforcement, Vicusi and Zeckhauser; publicmechanisms to support compliance to an environmental norm, Stranlund; privateenforcement of federal environmental law, Naysnerski and Tietenberg. Part 7Empirical work - describing the M&E situation in the US: monitoring andenforcement, Russell; environmental crime and punishment - legal/economictheory and empirical evidence on enforcement of federal environmentalstatutes. Part 8 Do monitoring and enforcement efforts make a difference?:effectiveness of the EPA's regulatory enforcement - the case of industrialeffluent standards, Magat and Viscusi; environmental inspections andemissions of the pulp and paper industry in Quebec; the costs and benefits ofoil spill prevention and enforcement, Cohen. Part 9 Cost and benefits ofmonitoring and enforcement: standard setting with incomplete enforcementrevisited, Jones. Part 10 Explaining the behaviour of enforcement agencies:the revealed preferences of state EPAs - stringency, enforcement andsubstitution.