De Matos, João Amaro 　著

内容

目次

List of Figures xi Preface xiii 01 Intended Audience xiv 02Organization of the Text xv 03 Acknowledgments .xvi PART I Foundations 11. Valuation 3 1.1. Valuation under Certainty 5 1.1.1. The Robinson CrusoeEconomy 5 1.1.2. Time Preferences 7 1.1.3. Production Opportunities 81.1.4. The Role of Capital Markets 9 1.1.5. Consumption and Investment withCapital Markets 11 1.1.6. The Value of an Investment Project 14 1.1.7.Multiperiod Economy with Capital Markets 15 1.1.8. Exercises 17 1.2.Valuation under Uncertainty 18 1.2.1. One-Period Model 18 1.2.2. Value andthe Absence of Arbitrage 22 1.2.3. Arbitrage Opportunities and Investment 231.2.4. Value and the Martingale Measure 24 1.2.5. Beta Values 26 1.2.6.Exercises 28 1.3. Multiperiods and Flexibility under Uncertainty 29 1.3.1.The Multiperiod Setting 30 1.3.2. Real Options 33 1.3.3. Some GeneralProperties of Options 34 1.3.4. Exercises 37 2. Optimal Capital Structure39 2.1. The MM Propositions 40 2.1.1. The Irrelevancy Statement 40 2.1.2.Cost of Capital 42 2.1.3. The MM Propositions with Taxes 44 2.1.4.Empirical Evidence 46 2.1.5. Exercises 47 2.2. Personal and CorporateTaxation 48 2.2.1. Demand for Bonds 49 2.2.2. Supply of Bonds 50 2.2.3.The Equilibrium 51 2.2.4. Comparing with MM 53 2.2.5. Changes inTaxations:An Alternative Equilibrium 54 2.2.6. Empirical Evidence 57 2.2.7.Exercises 58 PART II Agency and Information 59 3. Implications for CapitalStructure 61 3.1. The Role of Agency Costs 62 3.1.1. Agency Costs ofOutside Equity 64 3.1.2. Principal--Agent Problems 66 3.1.3. Agency Costsof Debt 71 3.1.4. Empirical Evidence 75 3.1.5. Exercises 77 3.2.Informational Asymmetries 78 3.2.1. Managers' Signaling because of FeeSchedules 79 3.2.2. When Managers Are Also Investors 82 3.2.3. SignalsConditioned by Investment Opportunities 85 3.2.4. Stock Repurchase as aSignal 89 3.2.5. Empirical Evidence 93 3.2.6. Exercises 95 4. PayoutPolicy 97 4.1. Dividend Policy 98 4.1.1. Another Irrelevancy Proposition 984.1.2. Alternative Valuations 100 4.1.3. Growth Rates 102 4.1.4. RelaxingCertainty 103 4.1.5. Dividends and Taxes 104 4.1.6. Empirical Evidence 1054.1.7. Exercises 109 4.2. Dividends and Information 110 4.2.1. TheInformational Content of Dividends 110 4.2.2. A Signaling Model 111 4.2.3.A Consistent Signaling Model 114 4.2.4. Empirical Evidence 116 4.2.5.Exercises 119 4.3. Stock Repurchases 119 4.3.1. Trends in Payout Policies120 4.3.2. Reasons for Stock Repurchases 121 4.3.3. Empirical Evidence 1225. Financial Contracting 125 5.1. Contracting and Allocation of Control 1265.1.1. The Model 127 5.1.2. Entrepreneur Control 129 5.1.3. InvestorControl 131 5.1.4. Contingent Control 133 5.1.5. Financing Contracts 1335.1.6. Exercises 134 5.2. Debt Contract Design 134 5.2.1. Extending theModel 134 5.2.2. The Case of Many Creditholders 137 5.2.3. The Choice ofthe Duration 139 5.2.4. The Effect of Seniority 146 5.2.5. Exercises 148PART III Capital Restructuring 149 6. GoingPublic 151 6.1. The Going PublicDecision 152 6.1.1. The Model 152 6.1.2. The Equilibrium 154 6.1.3.Empirical Evidence 160 6.1.4. Exercises 160 6.2. Underpricing andInformation Asymmetries 160 6.2.1. Asymmetry between Issuers andUnderwriters 162 6.2.2. Asymmetry between Investors 163 6.2.3. Reputationof Bankers and Uncertainty 165 6.2.4. How Underwriters Become Informed 1676.2.5. Legal Liabilities 171 6.2.6. Empirical Evidence 172 6.2.7. Exercises175 7. Going Private 177 7.1. Stock Repurchases 177 7.2. Leveraged Buyouts179 7.2.1. The Mechanismof Leveraged Buyouts 179 7.2.2. A Model for MBOs181 7.2.3. Empirical Evidence 186 7.2.4. Exercises 189 8. Mergers andAcquisitions 191 8.1. Tender Offers and the Free-Rider Problem 192 8.1.1.Largely Diffused Ownership 193 8.1.2. The Role of a Large Shareholder 1968.1.3. Uncertain Outcome of a Takeover 199 8.1.4. The Optimal Size of abefore a Takeover 201 8.1.5. Exercises 205 8.2. Merger Bids 205 8.2.1.Competition between Bidders 206 8.2.2. Choosing the Means of Payment 2078.2.3. Cash as a Preemptive Instrument with Many Bidders 212 8.2.4. TheChoice of Takeover Methods 214 8.2.5. Empirical Evidence 218 8.2.6.Exercises 223 PART IV Appendices 225 A. Optimization Principles 227 A.1.Unconstrained Optimization 227 A.2. Constrained Optimization 228 A.2.1.Equality Constraints 228 A.2.2. Inequality Constraints 231 B. Notions ofGame Theory 233 B.1. Introduction 233 B.2. Informational Equilibrium 234B.3. The Revelation Principle 238.Contents ix C. Suggested Solutions 241C.1. Valuation 241 C.1.1. Valuation under Certainty 241 C.1.2. Valuationunder Uncertainty 244 C.1.3. Valuation of Flexibility 250 C.2. OptimalCapital Structure 251 C.2.1. The MM Propositions 251 C.2.2. Personal andCorporate Taxation 255 C.3. Implications for Capital Structure 255 C.3.1.The Role of Agency Costs 255 C.3.2. Informational Asymmetries 260 C.4.Payout Policy 261 C.4.1. Dividend Policy 261 C.4.2. Dividend andInformation 263 C.5. Financial Contracting 266 C.5.1. Contracting andAllocation of Control 266 C.5.2. Debt Contract Design 267 C.6. Going Public268 C.6.1. The Going Public Decision 268 C.6.2. Underpricing andInformation Asymmetries 268 C.7. Going Private 270 C.7.1. Leveraged Buyouts270 C.8. Mergers and Acquisitions 271 C.8.1. Tender Offers and Free-RiderProblem 271 C.8.2. Merger Bids 276 Notes 279 Bibliography 285 Index 297