Laffont, Jean–jacques, Martimort, David 　著

内容

目次

xi Foreword Introduction 1 1 Incentives in Economic Thought 7 1.1Adam Smith and Incentive Contracts in Agriculture 8 1.2 Chester Barnard andIncentives in Management 11 1.3 Hume, Wicksell, Groves: The Free-RiderProblem 14 1.4 Borda, Bowen, Vickrey: Incentives in Voting 15 1.5 LeonWalras and the Regulation of Natural Monopolies 18 1.6 Knight, Arrow, Pauly:Incentives in Insurance 18 1.7 Sidgwick, Vickrey, Mirrlees: Redistributionand Incentives 20 1.8 Dupuit, Edgeworth, Pigou: Price Discrimination 22 1.9Incentives in Planned Economies 23 1.10 Leonid Hurwicz and Mechanism Design25 1.11 Auctions 27 2 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off 28 2.1 TheBasic Model 32 2.2 The Complete Information Optimal Contract 33 2.3Incentive Feasible Menu of Contracts 36 2.4 Information Rents 39 2.5 TheOptimization Program of the Principal 40 2.6 The Rent Extraction-EfficiencyTrade-Off 41 2.7 The Theory of the Firm Under Asymmetric Information 46 2.8Asymmetric Information and Marginal Cost Pricing 48 2.9 The RevelationPrinciple 48 2.10 A More General Utility Function for the Agent 51 2.11 ExAnte versus Ex Post Participation Constraints 57 2.12 Commitment 63 2.13Stochastic Mechanisms 65 2.14 Informative Signals to Improve Contracting 682.15 Contract Theory at Work 72 Appendix 81 3 Incentive and ParticipationConstraints with Adverse Selection 82 3.1 More than Two Types 86 3.2Multidimensional Asymmetric Information 93 3.3 Type-Dependent ParticipationConstraint and Countervailing Incentives 101 3.4 Random ParticipationConstraint 115 3.5 Limited Liability 118 3.6 Audit Mechanisms and CostlyState Verification 121 3.7 Redistributive Concerns and the Efficiency-EquityTrade-Off 134 Appendices 130 4 Moral Hazard: The Basic Trade-Offs 145 4.1The Model 148 4.2 Risk Neutrality and First-Best Implementation 153 4.3 TheTrade-Off Between Limited Liability Rent Extraction and Efficiency 155 4.4The Trade-Off Between Insurance and Efficiency 158 4.5 More than Two Levelsof Performance 163 4.6 Informative Signals to Improve Contracting 167 4.7Moral Hazard and the Theory of the Firm 172 4.8 Contract Theory at Work 1744.9 Commitment Under Moral Hazard 184 Appendices 185 5 Incentive andParticipation Constraints with Moral Hazard 187 5.1 More than Two Levels ofEffort 191 5.2 The Multitask Incentive Problem 203 5.3 Nonseparability ofthe Utility Function 226 5.4 Redistribution and Moral Hazard 232 Appendices235 6 Nonverifiability 260 6.1 No Contract at Date 0 and Ex Post Bargaining242 6.2 Incentive Compatible Contract 244 6.3 Nash Implementation 246 6.4Subgame-Perfect Implementation 256 6.5 Risk Aversion 261 6.6 ConcludingRemarks 264 7 Mixed Models 265 7.1 Adverse Selection Followed by MoralHazard 269 7.2 Moral Hazard Followed by Adverse Selection 294 7.3 MoralHazard Followed by Nonverifiability 298 8 Dynamics Under Full Commitment 3038.1 Repeated Adverse Selection 307 8.2 Repeated Moral Hazard 319 8.3Constraints on Transfers: The Role of Implicit Incentives 342 9 Limits andExtensions 347 9.1 Informed Principal 351 9.2 Limits to Enforcement 3609.3 Dynamics and Limited Commitment 364 9.4 The Hold-Up Problem 370 9.5Limits to the Complexity of Contracts 375 9.6 Limits in the Action Space 3879.7 Limits to Rational Behavior 391 9.8 Endogenous Information Structures395 References 399 Author Index 413 Subject Index 417