Holt, C.A. 　著

目次

Part I. Basic Concepts: Decisions, Game Theory, and Market EquilibriumChapter 1. Introduction Chapter 2. A Pit Market Chapter 3. Some Simple Games:Competition, Coordination, and Guessing Chapter 4. Risk and Decision MakingChapter 5. Randomized Strategies Part II. Market Experiments Chapter 6.Monopoly and Cournot Markets Chapter 7. Vertical Market Relationships Chapter8. Market Institutions and Power Chapter 9. Collusion and Price CompetitionChapter 10. Market Failure Due to Unraveling: Lemons and Matching MarketsChapter 11. Asset Markets and Price Bubbles Part III. Bargaining andBehavioral Labor Economics Chapter 12. Ultimatum Bargaining Chapter 13.Trust, Reciprocity, and Principal-Agent Games Part IV. Public Choice Chapter14. Voluntary Contributions Chapter 15. The Volunteer's Dilemma Chapter 16.Externalities, Congestion, and Common Pool Resources Chapter 17. Rent SeekingChapter 18. Voting and Politics Experiments Part V. Auctions Chapter 19.Private Value Auctions Chapter 20. The Takeover Game Chapter 21. Common-ValueAuctions and the Winner's Curse Chapter 22. Multi-Unit and CombinatorialAuctions Part VI. Behavioral Game Theory: Treasures and IntuitiveContradictions Chapter 23. Multi-Stage Games Chapter 24. Generalized MatchingPennies Chapter 25. The Traveler's Dilemma Chapter 26. Coordination GamesPart VII. Individual Decision Experiments Chapter 27. Probability MatchingChapter 28. Lottery Choice Anomalies Chapter 29. ISO (in Search of !) PartVIII. Information, Learning, and Signaling Chapter 30. Bayes' Rule Chapter31. Information Cascades Chapter 32. Statistical Discrimination Chapter 33.Signaling Games Chapter 34. Prediction Markets References Index ClassExperiments