Agénor, Pierre–richard, Montiel, Peter, Montiel, Peter J. 　著

内容

目次

Preface to the Second Edition xvii Introduction and Overview 3Chapter 1: Overview of the Book 4 2 Some Methodological Issues 10 1 Scope ofDevelopment Macroeconomics 13 1 Monetarism, Structuralism, and DevelopingNations 15 2 Economic Structure and Macroeconomics 18 2.1 Openness to Tradein Commodities and Assets 19 2.2 Exchange Rate Management 25 2.3 DomesticFinancial Markets 26 2.4 The Government Budget 28 2.5 Aggregate Supply andthe Labor Market 32 2.6 Stability of Policy Regimes 36 2.7 MacroeconomicVolatility 37 3 Some Special Topics 38 PART I: MACROECONOMICRELATIONSHIPS AND MARKET STRUCTURE 43 Chapter 2: Aggregate Accounts,Production, and Market Structure 45 1 A General Accounting Framework 46 1.1The Nonfinancial Private Sector 46 1.2 The Public Sector 48 1.2.1 TheNonfinancial Public Sector 48 1.2.2 The Central Bank 48 1.2.3 TheConsolidated Public Sector 49 1.3 The Commercial Banking System 50 1.4Aggregate Relationships 51 2 Production Structure in an Open Economy 52 2.1The Mundell-Fleming Model 52 2.2 The "Dependent Economy" Model 56 2.3 AModel with Three Goods 60 Chapter 3: The Structure of Labor Markets 633.1 Functioning of Labor Markets 64 3.2 Output and Unemployment 65 3.3Indexation and Wage Rigidity 66 3.4 Labor Market Segmentation 71Chapter 4: Informal Financial Markets 76 4.1 Informal Loan Markets 76 4.2Parallel Markets for Foreign Exchange 78 3 Behavioral Functions 86 1Consumption and Saving 86 1.1 Consumption Smoothing 90 1.2 Length ofPlanning Horizon and Liquidity Constraints 92 1.3 Effects of Interest RateChanges on Savings 93 1.4 Public and Private Consumption 95 2 PrivateInvestment 95 2.1 Specification Issues 96 2.2 Determinants of PrivateInvestment: The Evidence 99 3 The Demand for Money 102 3.1 ConventionalMoney Demand Models 103 3.2 Currency Substitution and the Demand for Money105 3.2.1 Domestic- and Foreign-Currency Deposits 106 3.2.2 CurrencySubstitution: The Evidence 109 4 Aggregate Supply Functions 111 4.1Cross-Regime Tests 113 4.2 Within-Regime Tests 114 4.3 An Assessment of theEvidence 117 Appendix: Uncertainty, Irreversibility, and Investment: ASimple Example 120 PART II: SHORT-RUN MACROECONOMIC POLICIES 123Chapter 4: Sources of Macroeconomic Fluctuations 125 1 The Data 126 2Detrending Techniques 128 2.1 The Hodrick-Prescott Filter 129 2.2 TheBand-Pass Filter 130 2.3 The Nonparametric Method 130 3 AssessingMacroeconomic Fluctuations 131 4 Summary of the Findings 133 Chapter 5:Fiscal Deficits, Public Solvency, and the Macroeconomy 136 1 The GovernmentBudget Constraint 137 1.1 The Consolidated Budget Constraint 137 1.2 TheMeasurement of Fiscal Deficits 141 1.3 Seigniorage and Inflationary Finance143 1.3.1 The Optimal Inflation Tax 146 1.3.2 Collection Lags and theOlivera-Tanzi Effect 148 1.3.3 Collection Costs and Tax System Efficiency153 2 Policy Consistency and the Solvency Constraint 154 2.1 TheIntertemporal Solvency Constraint 155 2.2 Financing Constraints and PolicyConsistency 158 3 Macroeconomic Effects of Fiscal Deficits 159 3.1Ricardian Equivalence 160 3.2 Deficits, Inflation, and the "Tight Money"Paradox 161 3.2.1 The Analytical Framework 165 3.2.2 Constant PrimaryDeficit 167 3.2.3 Constant Conventional Deficit 169 3.3 Deficits, RealInterest Rates, and Crowding Out 173 3.3.1 Expectations, Deficits, and RealInterest Rates 174 3.3.2 Deficits, Investment, and Crowding Out 181 3.4Deficits, the Current Account, and the Real Exchange Rate 182 Appendix:Fiscal Effects of Privatization 186 Chapter 6: Financial Markets,Capital Mobility, and Monetary Policy 189 1 Financial Repression:Macroeconomic Effects 190 2 Financial Repression, the Inflation Tax, andCapital Controls 192 2.1 Financial Repression and Inflationary Finance 1922.2 A General Public-Finance Approach 196 3 Capital Mobility: EmpiricalEvidence 198 3.1 The Magnitude of Gross Flows 199 3.2 Tests of InterestParity Conditions 200 3.3 Tests of Monetary Autonomy 204 3.4Saving-Investment Correlations 205 3.5 Summary 206 4 Models of InformalCredit and Foreign Exchange Markets 207 4.1 Models of Informal CreditMarkets 207 4.1.1 Stagflationary Effects of Monetary Policy 207 4.1.2Interest Rate Policy and Output 208 4.2 Models of Informal Currency Markets214 4.2.1 Illegal Trade and Parallel Markets 214 4.2.2 Portfolio andCurrency Substitution Models 217 5 Monetary Policy with Informal FinancialMarkets 221 5.1 The Analytical Framework 222 5.2 Changes in Monetary PolicyInstruments 226 5.2.1 Credit Expansion 227 5.2.2 Changes in theAdministered Interest Rate 228 5.2.3 Change in the Required Reserve Ratio229 5.2.4 Intervention in the Parallel Foreign Exchange Market 229 6 ASimulation Model with Informal Financial Markets 230 6.1 Structure of theModel 230 6.1.1 Aggregate Supply 231 6.1.2 Aggregate Demand and DisposableIncome 233 6.1.3 Asset Accumulation and Financial Wealth 234 6.1.4 TheCurrent Account and the Balance of Payments 235 6.1.5 The Banking System 2366.1.6 Fiscal Deficits and Domestic Credit 237 6.1.7 Calibration of theModel 238 6.2 Effects of Stabilization Policies 238 6.2.1 GovernmentSpending on Home Goods 239 6.2.2 Central Bank Credit to Commercial Banks 2406.2.3 Increase in Lending Rates 241 6.2.4 Devaluation of the OfficialExchange Rate 242 Chapter 7: Exchange-Rate Regimes: Evidence andCredibility Aspects 246 1 Evidence on Exchange-Rate Regimes 246 2Credibility and Exchange-Rate Management 251 2.1 Time Inconsistency andExchange-Rate Policy 253 2.2 Credibility of a Fixed Exchange Rate 258 2.3Reputation, Signaling, and Exchange-Rate Commitment 259 2.4 CredibilityEffects of Monetary Unions 262 3 Exchange Rate Bands 266 3.1 Rationale forExchange Rate Bands 266 3.2 Bands and Monetary Policy Credibility 268 3.3Experience with Exchange Rate Bands 269 3.3.1 Central Parity 270 3.3.2 BandWidth 276 3.3.3 Intramarginal Intervention 278 3.4 Lessons from Experience278 Appendix: Krugman's Target Zone Model 282 Chapter 8: Exchange-RateManagement: Contractionary Devaluation and Real-Exchange-Rate Rules 286 1Contractionary Devaluation 287 1.1 Effects on Aggregate Demand 287 1.1.1Consumption 288 1.1.2 Investment 298 1.1.3 Nominal Interest Rates 301 1.2Effects on Aggregate Supply 304 1.2.1 Effects on the Nominal Wage 305 1.2.2Imported Inputs 308 1.2.3 Effects Through Costs of Working Capital 310 1.3Empirical Evidence 312 1.3.1 Before-After Approach 312 1.3.2 Control GroupApproach 313 1.3.3 Econometric Models 315 1.3.4 Macro-Simulation Studies317 2 Real-Exchange-Rate Targeting 320 2.1 The Analytical Framework 3212.2 Targeting the Real Exchange Rate 323 2.3 Effects of Macroeconomic Shocks325 9 Stabilization and the Labor Market 329 1 The Model 330 1.1 TheFormal Economy 332 1.2 The Informal Sector 334 1.3 Consumption and Wealth335 1.4 Market for Informal Sector Goods 336 1.5 The Informal Labor Market336 1.6 Government 337 2 Dynamic Structure 337 3 The Steady State 339 4Government Spending Cut 342 PART III: STABILIZATION: THEORY, EVIDENCE,AND EMPIRICAL MODELS 347 Chapter 10: An Overview of Stabilization Programs349 1 Populism 351 1.1 Chile under Allende (1970-1973) 352 1.2 Peru underGarc?i? a (1986-1990) 354 2 Orthodox Money-Based Stabilization 355 2.1Chile (September 1973) 356 2.2 Bolivia (August 29, 1985) 358 3Exchange-Rate-Based (Southern Cone) Stabilization Programs 361 3.1 Chile(February 1978) 362 3.2 Uruguay (October 1978) 364 3.3 Argentina (December1978) 366 4 Heterodox Programs 368 4.1 Argentina (June 14, 1985) 369 4.2Israel (July 1, 1985) 373 4.3 Brazil (February 28, 1986) 379 4.4 Mexico(December 1987) 382 5 Argentina's Convertibility Plan (1991-1997) 385 6Brazil's Real Plan (1994-1997) 390 7 Lessons of Stabilization 395Chapter 11: Inflation and Short-Run Dynamics 397 1 Models of theInflationary Process 397 1.1 Inflation, Money, and Fiscal Deficits 3981.1.1 Adaptive Expectations 400 1.1.2 Perfect Foresight 402 1.2 FoodSupply, Distribution, and the Wage-Price Cycle 405 1.3 AStructuralist-Monetarist Model 411 2 Dynamics of Monetary and Exchange-RateRules 414 2.1 A One-Good Framework 414 2.1.1 Households 415 2.1.2Government and the Central Bank 418 2.1.3 Money Market Equilibrium 4192.1.4 Dynamic Form 419 2.1.5 Devaluation Rule 421 2.1.6 Credit Growth Rule425 2.1.7 Dynamics with Alternative Fiscal Policy Rules 427 2.2 AThree-Good Model with Flexible Prices 428 2.2.1 Households 429 2.2.2 Outputand the Labor Market 431 2.2.3 Central Bank and the Government 432 2.2.4Market-Clearing Conditions 432 2.2.5 Dynamic Form 432 2.2.6 Policy Shocks436 2.3 Extensions 442 2.3.1 Imported Intermediate Inputs 442 2.3.2 StickyPrices 443 Appendix: The Three-Good Model 447 Chapter 12: AnalyticalIssues in Disinflation Programs 450 1 Topics in Exchange-Rate-Based Programs450 1.1 The Boom-Recession Cycle 453 1.1.1 Expectations, Real InterestRates, and Output 453 1.1.2 The "Temporariness" Hypothesis 457 1.1.3 AnAssessment 466 1.2 The Behavior of Real Interest Rates 473 1.2.1Credibility, Nominal Anchors, and Interest Rates 474 1.2.2 Expectations,Fiscal Adjustment, and Interest Rates 475 1.3 Disinflation and Real Wages477 2 The Role of Credibility in Disinflation Programs 487 2.1 Sources ofCredibility Problems 488 2.1.1 Internal Inconsistency 488 2.1.2 TimeInconsistency 489 2.1.3 Asymmetric Information 491 2.1.4 Policy Uncertaintyand Stochastic Shocks 491 2.1.5 Political Uncertainty 492 2.2 Enhancing theCredibility of Disinflation Programs 493 2.2.1 Signaling and Sustainability494 2.2.2 Price Controls 496 2.2.3 Central Bank Independence 503 2.2.4External Enforcement and Foreign Assistance 505 2.2.5 Sequencing andPolitical Support 507 2.3 Policy Lessons 509 3 Disinflation and NominalAnchors 512 Appendix: Output Effects of Price Controls 517 Chapter 13:Empirical Models of Stabilization 521 1 Bank-Fund Models 523 1.1 The IMFFinancial Programming Model 523 1.2 The World Bank RMSM Model 525 1.3 ASimple Bank-Fund Model 527 2 Three-Gap Models 527 3 Macroeconometric Models531 3.1 Structure of Production 532 3.2 Aggregate Supply 533 3.3 AggregateDemand 535 4 Computable General Equilibrium Models 537 Appendix: TheKhan-Knight Monetary Disequilibrium Model 541 PART IV: EXTERNAL DEBT,CAPITAL FLOWS, AND CURRENCY CRISES 545 Chapter 14: The Debt Crisis of the1980s 547 1 Origins of the Debt Crisis 548 1.1 Public Sector Solvency 5501.2 Application to the Debt Crisis 551 2 Policy Response and MacroeconomicImplications 556 3 Resolution of the Crisis: The Brady Plan 558 3.1 Outlineof the Plan 558 3.2 Macroeconomic Effects: Conceptual Issues 559 3.3 AnOverview of Some Early Brady Plan Deals 567 Appendix: Incentive Effects of aDebt Overhang 572 15 Capital Inflows: Macroeconomic Effects and PolicyResponses 575 1 Capital Inflows in the Early 1990s 576 1.1 The Domestic andExternal Context 576 1.2 Characteristics of the New Inflows 577 1.2.1Magnitude 577 1.2.2 Timing 579 1.2.3 Regional and Country Destination 5791.2.4 Asset Composition 580 1.2.5 Sectoral Destination 582 2 FactorsDriving Capital Inflows 582 2.1 "Pull" Factors, "Push" Factors, and Changesin Financial Integration 582 2.1.1 "Pull" Factors 584 2.2.2 "Push" Factors585 2.1.3 Financial Integration 585 2.2 The Empirical Evidence 586 2.3 AnAssessment 591 3 Policy Responses: Issues and Evidence 591 3.1 PolicyOptions 591 3.1.1 Restrictions on Gross Inflows 593 3.1.2 Encouragement ofGross Outflows 594 3.1.3 Trade Liberalization 595 3.1.4 Exchange-RateFlexibility 596 3.1.5 Sterilization 597 3.1.6 Policies to Influence theMoney Multiplier 598 3.1.7 Fiscal Contraction 599 4 Variations in PolicyResponses 599 4.1 Measures to Impede Gross Inflows 600 4.2 Encouragementfor Gross Outflows 601 4.3 Measures to Reduce Reserve Accumulation 6024.3.1 Commercial Policy 602 4.3.2 Exchange-Rate Policy 602 4.4 Measures toRestrict Base Money Growth 603 4.5 Reduction in the Money Multiplier 6044.6 Restrictive Fiscal Policy 604 5 Macroeconomic Outcomes 605 6 PolicyLessons 607 Appendix: Reduction in the World Risk-Free Interest Rate in theThree-Good Model 612 Chapter 16: Speculative Attacks and Exchange-RateCrises 616 1 The Conventional Approach 617 1.1 The Basic Model 617 1.2Extensions to the Basic Framework 623 1.2.1 Sterilization 623 1.2.2Alternative Post-Collapse Regimes 624 1.2.3 Real Effects of an AnticipatedCollapse 626 1.2.4 Borrowing, Controls, and the Postponement of a Crisis 6282 Optimizing Policymakers and Self-Fulfilling Crises 631 2.1 TheOutput-Inflation Tradeoff 632 2.2 Public Debt and Self-Fulfilling Crises 6352.3 Credibility, Reputation, and Currency Crises 637 3 A "Cross-Generation"Framework 641 4 Evidence on Exchange-Rate Crises 641 4.1 The 1980s 642 4.2The 1994 Crisis of the Mexican Peso 644 4.2.1 Background: Structural Reformand the Solidarity Pact 644 4.2.2 Policy Responses to Capital Inflows,1989-1993 646 4.2.3 The Balance-of-Payments Crisis 648 4.3 Thailand'sCurrency Crisis 654 4.3.1 Background 654 4.3.2 Triggering Events 656 4.3.3Emergence and Management of the Crisis 658 PART V: GROWTH, STRUCTURALREFORMS, AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 667 Chapter 17: Macroeconomic Policies andLong-Term Growth 669 1 The Neoclassical Growth Model 671 2 Externalitiesand Increasing Returns 678 3 Human Capital, Knowledge, and Growth 680 3.1The Production of Human Capital 680 3.2 The Production of Knowledge 681 4Effects on Financial Intermediation 687 4.1 Effects on the Saving Rate 6884.2 Effects on the Allocation of Capital 689 4.3 The "Conduit" Effect,Financial Repression, and Growth 690 4.4 Financial Development and Growth:Empirical Evidence 691 5 Inflation Stabilization and Growth 692 6Government Size and Growth 697 7 Commercial Openness and Growth 698 8Exchange-Rate Unification and Growth 701 Chapter 18: Trade, Financial,and Exchange Market Reforms 705 1 Trade Reforms: Some Recent Evidence 706 2Trade Liberalization, Wage Rigidity, and Employment 709 2.1 The AnalyticalFramework 710 2.1.1 Fixed Nominal Wages 712 2.1.2 Flexible Wages 713 3Monetary and Financial Liberalization 714 3.1 Monetary Reform 715 3.2Financial Liberalization 719 4 Unification of Foreign Exchange Markets 7214.1 Short-Run Dynamics of Unification 722 4.1.1 The Pre-Reform Dual RateRegime 722 4.1.2 The Post-Reform Flexible Rate Regime 724 4.1.3 Dynamics inAnticipation of Reform 726 4.2 Longer-Run Effects of Unification 730 4.3Evidence on Unification Attempts 732 Chapter 19: The Political Economyof Stabilization and Adjustment 737 1 Politics, Economic Policy, andAdjustment 738 1.1 The Political Economy of Structural Adjustment 738 1.2Political Instability, Inflation, and Budget Deficits 740 2 PoliticalStabilization Cycles 741 2.1 Opportunistic Models 742 2.1.1 Elections,Inflation, and Unemployment 742 2.1.2 Elections and Devaluation Cycles 7452.2 Models With Informational Asymmetries 750 3 Elections-Induced EconomicCycles: The Evidence 752 3.1 Informal Evidence 752 3.2 Econometric Evidence754 3.2.1 General Cycles and Government Expenditure 755 3.2.2 Determinantsof Domestic Credit to the Government 757 3.2.3 Elections and the Compositionof Public Expenditure 758 Chapter 20: Sequencing and Speed of Reforms761 1 Sequencing of Reforms 761 1.1 Macroeconomic Stabilization, FinancialReform, and the Opening of the Capital Account 762 1.2 Capital and CurrentAccount Liberalization 764 1.3 Macroeconomic Stabilization and Trade Reform767 2 Uncertainty and Gradualism 770 3 Adjustment Costs, Credibility, andthe Speed of Reform 774 Epilogue 777 References 781 Index of Names 827Index of Subjects 835