【第5巻:ハーサニ、ナッシュ、ゼルテン、オーマン、シュリング】
John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash Jr., Reinhard Selten, Robert J. Aumann and Thomas C. Schelling(Pioneering Papers of the Nobel Mem
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Contents:AcknowledgementsGeneral IntroductionPART I JOHN C. HARSANYIIntroduction to Part IHoward R. Vane and Chris Mulhearn1. John C. Harsanyi(1967), 'Games With Incomplete Information Played By BayesianA" Players,I-III. Part I. The Basic Model'2. John C. Harsanyi (1968a), 'Games WithIncomplete Information Played By BayesianA" Players, Part II. BayesianEquilibrium Points'3. John C. Harsanyi (1968b), 'Games With IncompleteInformation Played By 'Bayesian' Players, Part III. The Basic ProbabilityDistribution of the Game'PART II JOHN F. NASH Jr. Introduction to PartIIHoward R. Vane and Chris Mulhearn4. John F. Nash Jr. (1950a), 'EquilibriumPoints in N-Person Games'5. John F. Nash Jr. (1950b), 'The BargainingProblem'6. John Nash (1951), 'Non-Cooperative Games'7. John Nash (1953),'Two-Person Cooperative Games'PART III REINHARD SELTEN Introduction to PartIIIHoward R. Vane and Chris Mulhearn8. Reinhard Selten (1975), 'Reexaminationof the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games'9.Reinhard Selten (1983), 'A Model of Oligopolistic Size, Structure andProfitability'10. Reinhard Selten and Peter Hammerstein (1984), 'Gaps inHarley's Argument on Evolutionarily Stable Learning Rules and in the Logic ofTit for TatA"'11. Reinhard Selten (1990), 'Bounded Rationality'12. ReinhardSelten, Michael Mitzkewitz and Gerald R. Uhlich (1997), 'Duopoly StrategiesProgrammed by Experienced Players'PART IV ROBERT J. AUMANN Introduction toPart IVHoward R. Vane and Chris Mulhearn13. Robert J. Aumann (1959),'Acceptable Points in General Cooperative n-Person Games'14. Robert J. Aumannand Michael B. Maschler ([1966], 1995), 'Game Theoretic Aspects of GradualDisarmament'15. Robert J. Aumann (1974), 'Subjectivity and Correlation inRandomized Strategies'16. Robert J. Aumann (1976), 'Agreeing to Disagree'17.Robert J. Aumann and Lloyd L. Shapley (1976), 'Long-Term Competition: A GameTheoretic Analysis'18. Robert J. Aumann (1987), 'Correlated Equilibrium as anExpression of Bayesian Rationality'PART V THOMAS C. SCHELLINGIntroduction toPart VHoward R. Vane and Chris Mulhearn19. Thomas C. Schelling (1956), 'AnEssay on Bargaining'20. Thomas C. Schelling (1957), 'Bargaining,Communication, and Limited War'21. Thomas C. Schelling (1971), 'DynamicModels of Segregation'22. Thomas C. Schelling (1980), 'The Intimate Contestfor Self-Command'23. Thomas C. Schelling (1983), 'Ethics, Law, and theExercise of Self-Command'24. Thomas C. Schelling (1984), 'Self-Command inPractice, in Policy, and in a Theory of Rational Choice'Name Index