Smit, Han T. J., Trigeorgis, Lenos 　著

内容

目次

List of Figures xi List of Tables xvii List of Boxes xixAcknowledgments xxi Introduction: Strategic Investment as Real Options andGames xxiii I.1. Introduction: About This Book xxiii I.2. Real Options andGames: Linking Corporate Finance and Strategy xxiv I.3. An Overview of theBook xxviii Part I: Approaches to Strategic Investment Chapter 1 CorporateFinance and Strategic Planning: A Linkage 3 1.1. Introduction 3 1.2. TheMarket Value of Growth Opportunities 5 1.3. From NPV to an Expanded(Strategic) NPV Criterion 8 1.4. Value Drivers of NPV, Flexibility Value,and Strategic Value 13 1.4.1. Value Drivers of NPV 14 1.4.2. Drivers ofFlexibility or Growth Option Value 21 1.4.3. Drivers of Strategic Value andStrategic Moves 24 1.5. Value Creation in Strategic Planning 32 1.6.Conclusions 33 Chapter 2 Strategic Management: Competitive Advantage andValue Creation 35 2.1. Introduction 35 2.2. Views of Value Creation of theFirm 38 2.2.1. Industry and Competitive Analysis 40 2.2.2. StrategicConflict and Game Theory 43 2.2.3. Internal, Resource-Based View of the Firm45 2.2.4. Dynamic Capabilities 49 2.2.5. Options and Games: A LinkageApproach 51 2.3. Competitive Advantage and Industry Evolution 53 2.3.1.Competitive Advantage in the Early and Growth Stages 54 2.3.2. CompetitiveAdvantage in Mature Businesses 58 2.3.3.Creative Destruction and Adaptationas Source of Advantage 60 2.4. Portfolio Planning of Growth Opportunities 682.4.1. Boston Consulting Group Matrix 70 2.4.2. Exercise Timing of Options:The Tomato Garden Analogy 72 2.4.3. Real-Options Growth Matrix 76 2.5.Conclusions 90 Chapter 3 Corporate Real Options 93 3.1. Introduction 933.2. Options Valuation 94 3.2.1. Basic Nature of Options 98 3.2.2. FromFinancial to Real Options Valuation 100 3.3. Overview of Common Real Options106 3.3.1. The (Simple) Option to Defer 110 3.3.2. Options to Expand orContract 114 3.3.3. The Option to Abandon for Salvage or Switch Use 1163.3.4. The Option to Temporarily Shut Down 119 3.3.5. Options to SwitchInputs or Outputs 122 3.4. Prototype Examples: Valuing an R & D Program anda Mining Concession 123 3.4.1. Valuing a Research and Development Program124 3.4.2. Valuing a Mine Concession (License) Using Certainty-EquivalentValuation 127 3.5. An In-Depth Case Application: Valuing Offshore OilConcessions in the Netherlands 134 3.5.1. Stages of Offshore PetroleumDevelopment on the Dutch Continental Shelf 134 3.5.2. Valuation Based onReplication in Financial Markets 138 3.5.3. Main Insights 149 3.6. Summaryand Conclusions 154 Appendix 3.1. Binomial Option Valuation 156 Chapter 4Games and Strategic Decisions 163 4.1. Introduction 163 4.2. The Rules ofthe Game 171 4.3. A Taxonomy of Basic Games 181 4.3.1. Time to Launch underCompetition (Symmetric Innovation Race) 184 4.3.2. Asymmetric InnovationRace and Preemption 186 4.3.3. Simultaneous Innovation Race When theOpponent's Capabilities Are Unknown 189 4.4. Competitive Reactions inQuantity versus Price Competition 191 4.4.1. Quantity Competition 1914.4.2. Price Competition 198 4.4.3. Type of Competitive Reaction: StrategicSubstitutes versus Complements 200 4.5. Two-Stage Games: Strategic Value ofEarly Commitment 202 4.5.1. Direct versus Strategic Effects of InvestmentCommitment 203 4.5.2. Strategic Effect, Tough or Accommodating Positions,and Type of Competition 205 4.6. Summary and Conclusions 208 Appendix 4.1.A Chronology of Game Theory Developments 210 Part II: Competitive Strategyand Games Chapter 5 Simple Strategic Investment Games 217 5.1. Introduction217 5.2. A Road Map for Analyzing Competitive Strategies 218 5.3. One-StageStrategic Investments 222 5.4. Two-Stage (Compound) Options: The Case ofProprietary R & D 226 5.5. Two-Stage Investments with Endogenous Competition229 5.5.1. Competition in Last (Production) Stage: Contrarian versusReciprocating Competition 229 5.5.2. Competition in Innovation Investment:Time-to-Market Races and Strategic Alliances 242 5.6. Cooperation in theFirst Stage: Joint R & D Ventures 247 5.7. Summary and Conclusions 251Chapter 6 Flexibility and Commitment 255 6.1. Introduction 255 6.2. TheBasic Two-Stage Game 258 6.2.1. Equilibrium Quantities, Prices, and PayoffValues 260 6.2.2. Valuation of Competitive Strategies 262 6.3. NumericalExamples of Different Competitive Strategies under Contrarian versusReciprocating Competition 268 6.3.1. Competitive R & D Strategies underQuantity Competition 268 6.3.2. Goodwill/Advertising Strategies under PriceCompetition 278 6.4. Summary and Conclusions 285 Appendix 6.1. ReactionFunctions, Equilibrium Actions, and Values in Different Market Structuresunder Quantity or Price Competition 289 Chapter 7 Value Dynamics inCompetitive R & D Strategies 295 7.1. Introduction 295 7.2. Literature on R& D Options 296 7.3. The Basic Two-Stage R & D Game 298 7.4. CriticalDemand Zones/Sensitivity 300 7.5. Technical R & D Uncertainty, StochasticReaction Functions, and Asymmetric Information with Signaling 309 7.5.1.Technical R & D Uncertainty (under Symmetric Information) 309 7.5.2.Imperfect/Asymmetric Information and Stochastic Reaction Functions 3117.5.3. Signaling Effects 313 7.6. Learning Experience Cost Effects 315 7.7Competition versus Cooperation in R & D 319 7.8 Summary and Conclusions 322Part III: Applications and Implications Chapter 8 Case Applications 3298.1. Introduction 329 8.2. Strategic Games in Consumer Electronics 3468.2.1. Winner Takes All versus Strategic Alliances in the Launch of VideoRecorder Systems 346 8.2.2. The Competition versus Coordination Game of theHigh-Density Disk 350 8.3. Buy-and-Build Platform Acquisition Strategies 3528.3.1. Classifying Acquisitions Based on Options and Games 353 8.3.2.Growth Option Value in a Buy-and-Build Strategy 356 8.3.3. Competition in aBuy-and-Build Strategy 360 8.4. Infrastructure Investment: The Case ofEuropean Airport Expansion 366 8.4.1. Infrastructure Investment and AviationDevelopments 367 8.4.2. Infrastructure Valuation as an Options Game 3708.4.3. Implementation in the Case of Schiphol Airport 382 8.5. Conclusionsand Implications 389 Chapter 9 Continuous-Time Models and Applications 3939.1. Introduction and Overview 393 9.2. Continuous-Time Version ofSmit-Trigeorgis Framework 396 9.2.1. Equilibrium Output and Values 3979.2.2. Strategic Entry Decisions 401 9.2.3. Equilibrium Entry and CriticalDemand Thresholds 405 9.2.4. Benchmark Cases: Symmetric Competition andMonopoly 408 9.3. Strategic Investment Timing under Uncertainty 408 9.3.1.Strategic Interactions and the Timing of Investment 408 9.3.2. Innovationwith Uncertainty over Completion and Time Delays 411 9.4. ExerciseStrategies under Incomplete Information with Applications 414 9.4.1. Entryand Preemption under Incomplete Information 414 9.4.2. Applications 4169.5. General Equilibrium Investment Strategies under Imperfect Competitionand Asymmetric Information 419 9.5.1. Equilibrium Investment Strategiesunder Imperfect Competition 419 9.5.2. Investment Strategies underAsymmetric Information 421 9.6. Conclusions 423 Appendix 9.1. Derivation ofOption-Pricing Differential Equation 425 Appendix 9.2. Discounted ProfitFlow and Value Function 427 Appendix 9.3. Sequential StackelbergLeader-Follower Entry 428 Chapter 10 Overview and Implications 429 10.1.Introduction 429 10.1.1. Linking Corporate Finance and Strategic Planning429 10.1.2. An Expanded Valuation Framework to Capture Flexibility andStrategic Value 431 10.2. Implications of the Strategic Options and GamesFramework 439 10.2.1. Timing Games for Simple Commercial Options 44010.2.2. Investment Games Involving Strategic Options 442 10.3. EmpiricalImplications 445 References 447 Index 461