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目次

Part I: Information and Incentives: Organizations and Markets ; Baron &Besanko (Monitoring of Performance in Organizational Contracting: TheCase of Defence Procurement) Riordan & Sappington (Commitment inProcurement Contracting) B Allen (Using Trembling-Hand Perfection toAlleviate the Interlinked Principal-Agent Problem) T M Andersen (Rulesor Discretion in Public Sector Decision-Making Milgrom & J Roberts(Communication and Inventories as Substitutes in Organizing Production)Guesnerie & Oddou (Increasing Returns to Size and their Limits) Arnott& Stiglitz (The Basic Analytics of Moral Hazard) Bester (QualitativeUncertainty in a Market with Bilateral Trading) Laffont & Rochet (StockMarket Portfolios and Segmentation of the Insurance Market) Gjesdal(Piecewise Linear Incentive Schemes) ; Part II Information andIncentives Labour, Wages and Contracts ; Lindbeck & Snower (LabourTurnover as an Incentive Mechanism) Ulph & Ulph (Bargaining Structuresand Delay in Innovation) Naslund (Dynamic Behaviour of a Labour-ManagedTeam) Ireland (Internal Labour Markets and Democratic Labour-ManagedFirms) Azariadis (Human Capital and Self-Enforcing Contracts) Brown &Wolfstetter (Optimal Unemployment Insurance Systems and ExperienceRating) R Wilson (Credentials and Wage Discrimination) L G Svensson(Fair Wages When Individual Information is Incomplete - An Applicationof a Model with Indivisibilities) Kahn (Separating and PoolingEquilibrium in Optimal Employment Contracts) Hoel & Moene(Profit-Sharing, Unions and Investment) Lyttkens (Incentives in SwedishWork Environment Regulation) Askildsen (Allocation of Capital andLabour in a Labour-Owned Firm Consisting of Heterogeneous Workers) ;