Fudenberg, Drew 　著

内容

目次

Part 1 Static games of complete information: games in strategic form andNash equilibrium; iterated strict dominance, rationalizability, andcorrelated equilibrium. Part 2 Dynamic games of complete information:extensive-form games; applications of multi-stage games with observedactions; repeated games. Part 3 Static games of incomplete information:Bayesian games and Bayesian equilibrium; Bayesian games and mechanism design.Part 4 Dynamic games of incomplete information: equilibrium refinements -perfect Bayesian equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, and trembling-handperfection; reputation effects; sequential bargaining under incompleteinformation. Part 5 Advanced topics: more equilibrium refinements -stability, forward induction, and iterated weak dominance; advanced topics instrategic-form games; payoff-relevant strategies and Markov equilibrium;common knowledge and games.