内容

目次

Preface. Contents and Purpose. Changes in the Second Edition. Using the Book. The Level of Mathematics. Other Books. Acknowledgements. Introduction. History. Game Theory's Method. Exemplifying Theory. This Book's Style. Notes. Part I: Game Theory:. 1. Rules of the Game. 1.1. Basic Definitions. 1.2. Dominant Strategies: The Prisoner's Dilemma. 1.3. Iterated Dominance: Battle of Bismarck Sea. 1.4. Nash Equilibrium: Boxed Pigs, Battle of the Sexes, and Ranked Coordination. 1.5. Focal Points. Notes. Problems. 2. Information. 2.1. Strategic and Extensive Forms of a Game. 2.2. Information Sets. 2.3. Perfect, Certain, Symmetric, and Complete Information. 2.4. The Harsanyi Transformation and Bayesian Games. 2.5. Example: The Png Settlement Game. Notes. Problems. 3. Mixed and Continuous Strategies. 3.1. Mixed Strategies: The Welfare Game. 3.2. Chicken, The War of Attrition, and Correlated Strategies. 3.3. Mixed Strategies with General Parameters and N Players: The Civic Duty Game. 3.4. Randomizing versus Mixing: The Auditing Game. 3.5. Continuos Strategies: The Cournet Game. Notes. Problems. 4. Dynamic Games with Symmetric Information. 4.1. Subgame Perfectness. 4.2. An Example of Perfectness: Entry Deterrence I. 4.3. Credible Threats, Sunk Costs, and the Open–Set [problem in the Game of Nuisance Suits. 4.4. Recoordination of Pareto–Dominant Equilibria in Subgames: Pareto Perfection. 4.5. Discounting. 4.6. Evolutionary Equilibrium: The Hawk–Dove Game. Notes. Problems. 5. Reputation and Repeated Games with Symmetric Information. 5.1. Finitely Repeated Games and the Chainstore Paradox. 5.2. Infinitely Repeated Games, Minimax Punishments and the Folk Theorem. 5.3. Reputation: The One–Sided Prisoner's Dilemma. 5.4. Product Quality in an Infinitely Repeated Game. 5.5. Markov Equilibria and Overlapping Generations in the Game of Customer Switching Costs. Notes. Problems. 6. Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information. 6.1. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: Entry Deterrence II and III. 6.2. Refining Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: The PhD Admissions Game. 6.3. The Importance of Common Knowledge: Entry Deterrence IV and V. 6.4. Incomplete Information in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: The Gang of Four Model. 6.5. The Axelrod Tournament. Notes. Problems. Part II: Asymmetric Information:. 7. Moral Hazard: Hidden Actions. 7.1. Categories of Asymmetric Information Models. 7.2. A Principal–Agent Model: The Production Game. 7.3. Finding Optimal Contracts: The Three–Step Procedure and the Incentive Compatibility and Participation Constraints. 7.4. Optimal Contracts: The Broadway Game. 7.5. State–Space Diagrams: Insurance Games I and II. Notes. Problems. 8. Topics in Moral Hazard. 8.1. Pooling Versus Separating Equilibria and the Revaluation Principle. 8.2. An Example of Moral Hazard with Hidden Knowledge: The Salesman Game. 8.3. Renogotiation of Contracts: The Repossession Game. 8.4. Efficiency Wages. 8.5. Tournaments. 8.6. Institutions and Agency Problems. 8.7. Teams. Notes. Problems. 9. Adverse Selection. 9.1. Introduction: Production Game VII. 9.2. Adverse Selection under Certainty: Lemons I and II. 9.3. Heterogenous Tastes: Lemons III and IV. 9.4. Adverse Selection under Uncertainty: Insurance Game III. 9.5. Other Equilibrium Concepts: Wilson Equilibrium and Reactive Equilibrium. 9.6. The Groves Mechanism. 9.7. A Variety of Applications. Notes. Problems. 10. Signalling. 10.1. The Informed Player Moves First: Signalling. 10.2. Variants on the Signalling Model of Education. 10.3. General Comments on Signalling in Education. 10.4. The Informed Player Moves Second: Screening. 10.5. Two Signals: The Game of Underpricing New Stock Issues. Notes. Issues. Part III: Applications:. 11. Bargaining. 11.1. The Basic Bargaining Problem: Splitting a Pie. 11.2. The Nash Bargaining Solution. 11.3. Alternating Offers over Finite Time. 11.4. Alternating Offers over Infinite Time. 11.5. Incomplete Information. Notes. Problems. 12. Auctions. 12.1. Auction Classification adn Private–Value Strategies. 12.2. Comparing Auction Roles. 12.3. Common–Value Auctions and the Winter's Curse. 12.4. Information in Common–Value Auctions. Notes. Problems. 13. Pricing. 13.1. Quantities as Stategies: Cournot Equilibrium Revisited. 13.2. Prices as Strategies: Bertrand Equilibrium. 13.3. Location Models. 13.4. Comparative Statics and Supermodular Games. 13.5. Durable Monopoly. Notes. Problems. 14. Entry. 14.1. Innovation and Patent Races. 14.2. Signal Jamming. 14.3. Predatory Pricing: The Kerps–Wilson Model. 14.4. Entry for Buyout. Notes. 15. The New Industrial Organization. 15.1. Credit and the Age of the Firm: The Diamond Model. 15.2. Takeovers and Green mail. 15.3. Market Microstructure. 15.4. Rate of Return Regulation and Government Procurement. Appendix A: Answers to Odd–Numbered Problems. Appendix B: Mathematics. Notation. Glossary. Risk. Supermodularity. References and Name Index. Index.