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【進化ゲームと均衡選択】

Evolutionary Games & Equilibrium Selection H 320 p. 97

Samuelson, Larry 　著

絶版
価格 \-

発行年月	1997年04月
出版社／提供元	The MIT Press
出版国	アメリカ合衆国
言語	英語
媒体	冊子
装丁	hardcover
ページ数／巻数	320 p.
ジャンル	洋書／社会科学／経済学／数理経済・計量経済・実験経済
ISBN	9780262193825
商品コード	0209709576
本の性格	学術書
書評掲載誌	Journal of Economic Literature
商品URL	https://kw.maruzen.co.jp/ims/itemDetail.html?itmCd=0209709576

内容

Examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and theequilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games. After providing anoverview of the basic issues of game theory, the book addresses evolutionarystability, the dynamics of sample paths, and strict Nash equilibria.

Part 1 Introduction: game theory; equilibrium; evolutionary games;evolution; evolution and equilibrium; the path ahead. Part 2 The evolution ofmodels: evolutionarily stable strategies; alternative notions of evolutionarystability; synamic systems. Part 3 A model of evolution: the aspiration andimitation model; time; sample paths; stationary distributions; limits.Appendix: proofs. Part 4 The dynamics of sample paths: dynamics; equilibrium;strictly dominated strategies; weakly dominated strategies. Appendix: proofs.Part 5 The ultimatum game: the ultimatum game; an ultimatum minigame;numerical calculations; relevance to experimental data? leaving money on thetable. Appendix: proofs. Part 6 Drift: introduction; the model; when candrift be ignored? when drift matters; examples; discussion. Part 7 Noise: themodel; limit distributions; alternative best replies; trembles. Appendix:proofs. Part 8 Backward and forward induction: introduction; the model;recurrent outcomes; backward induction; forward induction; markets. appendix:proofs. Part 9 Strict Nash equilibria: a muddling model; dynamics;equilibrium selection; risk dominance; discussion. Part 10 Conclusion.