内容

目次

Part 1 Introduction: game theory; equilibrium; evolutionary games;evolution; evolution and equilibrium; the path ahead. Part 2 The evolution ofmodels: evolutionarily stable strategies; alternative notions of evolutionarystability; synamic systems. Part 3 A model of evolution: the aspiration andimitation model; time; sample paths; stationary distributions; limits.Appendix: proofs. Part 4 The dynamics of sample paths: dynamics; equilibrium;strictly dominated strategies; weakly dominated strategies. Appendix: proofs.Part 5 The ultimatum game: the ultimatum game; an ultimatum minigame;numerical calculations; relevance to experimental data? leaving money on thetable. Appendix: proofs. Part 6 Drift: introduction; the model; when candrift be ignored? when drift matters; examples; discussion. Part 7 Noise: themodel; limit distributions; alternative best replies; trembles. Appendix:proofs. Part 8 Backward and forward induction: introduction; the model;recurrent outcomes; backward induction; forward induction; markets. appendix:proofs. Part 9 Strict Nash equilibria: a muddling model; dynamics;equilibrium selection; risk dominance; discussion. Part 10 Conclusion.